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Negotiations over professional boundaries are often contests about controlling
technical expertise and authority. Less is known about the role of moral
judgments in such contests because well-trained professionals often silence
their moral commitments or engage moral debates outside the boundaries of
their profession. Drawing on an ethnographic study of a science laboratory at
the forefront of moral controversy, this article shows how professionals man-
age moral challenges by reconfiguring their conventional domain of expert
authority to include moral as well as technical expertise. Scientists drew on
their plural moral views to develop, apply, and mobilize abstract knowledge
about morals as resources to claim authority in debates over the moral defini-
tion of their work. Collective learning and collaboration ensured the cohesion of
the professional community throughout the process of developing authority
despite continued moral pluralism. By unpacking one mechanism for the pur-
suit of moral authority, the study elaborates our understanding of the moral
foundations of professionalism and of the emergence of morally complex work
activities.
Keywords: professions, moral authority, expert control, science
The construction of jurisdictional boundaries—the legal, social, and symbolic
boundaries that enable professionals to claim authority over a work domain—is
a core dynamic of professions (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1988; Gieryn, 1999;
Lamont and Molnar, 2002; Larson, 2013). Jurisdictions enable professionals to
sustain control over their work, to organize and advance their discipline, and to
translate knowledge and skills into social and economic rewards. Professionals
construct, maintain, and expand jurisdictions primarily through claims to apply
distinct bodies of knowledge to address central social needs and values
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(Abbott, 1988; Gieryn, 1999; Freidson, 2001; Larson, 2013). Thus jurisdictional
boundary work involves both technical and normative dimensions. While
scholars have developed a detailed understanding of boundary work through
contests for the control of abstract technical knowledge (e.g., Barley, 1986;
Vallas, 2001; Bechky 2003; Huising, 2014), they more rarely consider how
boundaries of expert authority may be challenged, maintained, or renegotiated
through contests concerning the morality of professional endeavors.
This is unfortunate because professions are often described as either inher-
ently moral or, conversely, as opaque and silent about their moral
commitments, eschewing more detailed examination of the process by which
collective understandings about the morality of professions are maintained or
shifted. Professions have been described as moral institutions characterized by
‘‘an ideology serving some transcendent value asserting greater devotion to
doing good work than to economic reward’’ (Freidson, 2001). Zelizer (1983:
136) wrote that ‘‘professions institutionalize altruism while business
institutionalizes self-interest.’’ Professionalism itself, as an orientation to work,
is considered a means to moralize organized practices (Khurana, 2010). Ethical
problems in professional work are often explained by institutional failures such
as governance failures (Freidson and Rhea, 1963; Hughes, 1971; Silbey and
Ewick, 2003; Huising and Silbey, 2011) and not by variations in a profession’s
normative commitments. Yet not all problems derive from fraud or malpractice.
For example, issues such as health, environmental, or financial problems and
crises emerge when professional experts restrict themselves to questions of
technique and exclude the consideration of, or compliance with, societal goals
(Freidson, 2001; Silbey, 2009; Briscoe and Murphy, 2012; Pernell, Jung, and
Dobbin, 2017).
So how do professionals construct authority over the morality of their work?
We know that aspiring professionals craft narratives aimed at fostering moral
legitimacy—the social perception that their activities are right or at least in con-
formity with social norms of propriety (Suchman, 1995)—for their occupation
(Zelizer, 1983; Chan, 2009; Anteby, 2010; Fayard, Stigliani, and Bechky, 2017).
However, narratives adopted for legitimacy purposes tend to be shaped by
external sources of authority such as states, churches, or long-established tra-
dition (Zelizer, 1983) rather than driven by internal goals and practices (Meyer
and Rowan, 1977; Turco, 2012). Thus moral legitimacy does not imply moral
authority—the legitimate control (Weber, 1965) over the definition of what is
right for a community.1 We need a fuller account of whether and how
professionals in their everyday performance of occupational roles might craft
and claim such authority in the definition of what is right—a form of moral
authority.
Professionals do challenge established assumptions about what is consid-
ered right for their profession. For example, physicians have defended shorter
workweeks for hospital interns as desirable for patients and employees,
against the traditional professional values of continuity of care and full dedica-
tion of physicians to their patients (Kellogg, 2009). Other professionals have
1 Morals are defined as what is considered right or appropriate by a community (Durkheim, 1976).
This definition of what is moral does not imply a hierarchy of what is moral but allows the moralities
and moral accounts of groups to be examined as ‘‘facts’’ (Durkheim, 1976; Boltanski and
Thevenaut, 2006; Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013).
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debated whether to include moral values in their practice. For instance,
nanoscientists and chemists have debated whether including environmental
considerations in scientific processes and materials should be their responsibil-
ity (McCarthy and Kelty, 2010; Howard-Grenville et al., 2017). These instances
highlight that professionals do not always automatically conform to the moral
rules of their profession but may autonomously negotiate those rules (Strauss
et al., 1963; Gouldner, 1973). Yet we lack an account of how professionals
maintain, defend, or develop their capacity to control debates about the moral-
ity of their work.
Although prior studies have linked micro accounts of morality to macro
dynamics of professions and occupations claiming legitimacy for their
jurisdictions (e.g., Chan, 2009; Anteby, 2010; Turco, 2012; Fayard, Stigliani, and
Bechky, 2017), scholars have rarely considered whether and how these micro-
level accounts may be mobilized for the pursuit of expanded professional
authority. This paper draws on an instance of a debate over professional
practices to analyze how jurisdictional boundaries may be reconfigured to
include authority over moral matters. The context for this study is the debate
over the use of human embryos and the human embryonic stem cells (hESCs)
derived from these embryos for scientific research. Drawing on the micro
ground-level analysis of one prominent laboratory at the center of the debate,
I show how its members mobilized their accounts about the morality of their
work to integrate the moral definition of their work within their boundaries of
expert authority. The outcome of their actions was the development of a form
of moral authority.
PROFESSIONAL AUTHORITY, EXPERTISE, AND MORALS
While professional occupations emerged with an avowed moral commitment
to serving societal needs, professionals have since then largely restricted their
authoritative claims to abstract technical expertise and excluded moral
questions from their area of authority. In doing so, they have relinquished the
capacity to control the moral debates related to their professional activities.
Early professional occupations emerged based on the model of the clergy,
with the commitment to addressing specific social needs, such as health or jus-
tice, and with that commitment sometimes formalized in codes of ethics
(Parsons, 1939; Greenwood, 1957). The expansion of professional authority
has rested on members’ ability to enact strong social and symbolic boundaries
through the development and monopoly of abstract knowledge rather than
on their claims to superior morality (Freidson, 1988, 2001; Larson, 2013).
Professions achieve the highest level of authority over a work domain through
boundary disputes in which occupational groups compete for the control of a
work area—or jurisdiction—by convincing audiences of the validity of their
claim to expertise (Abbott, 1988). The social, symbolic, and legal boundaries of
professions have emerged through this rhetorical, symbolic, and discursive
work of claiming authority over a set of activities both in the public spheres
(Wolpe, 1985; Abbott, 1988; Gieryn, 1999) and in the workplace (Vallas, 2001;
Bechky, 2003). The development, use, and monopolization of abstract knowl-
edge is central to boundary work (Freidson, 1988; Larson, 2013). Command
of abstract knowledge provides resources for displays of expertise, which
become independent sources of authority (Wrong, 1979). For instance, the first
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experimentalists used public demonstrations of their scientific instruments to
assert the superiority of empirical knowledge over philosophical knowledge and
thereby claim authority over the production of what counted as knowledge
(Shapin and Schaffer, 1985).
These displays of expertise involve both the demarcation of a human or
social problem (such as disease, crime, or ignorance) and a claim to solve or
treat the problem through distinctly appropriate knowledge and skills (Abbott,
1988; Larson, 2013). The construction of the human or social problem underlies
the profession’s ability to claim expertise in solving it. As Abbott (1988: 57)
noted, ‘‘The profession reshapes [its] core as it pulls the task apart into constit-
uent problems, identifies them for clients, reasons about them, and then
generates solutions shaped to client and case. Throughout this reshaping of
objective facts by subjective means there emerges a fully defined task, irreduc-
ibly mixing the real and the constructed.’’ The outcome of these constructions
is the internalization of specific task areas within a sphere of authority.
This process of demarcation of a problem amenable to expert authority has
left moral problems beyond those boundaries of authority. When challenged on
the morality of their practices, professionals have generally refused to seek or
develop any form of authority in moral debates. Instead, they appear to either
silence their commitments and ‘‘hive off’’ (Hughes, 1971) control over moral
questions to external parties or pursue legitimacy by adopting predetermined
moral templates.
Several professional groups have thus remained or become silent about their
values (Jackall, 1988; Anteby, 2013). For example, while professionals in man-
agement education made moral claims about their mission to educate in the
founding days of management schools, they later restricted their claims and
prescriptions to the development and diffusion of abstract administrative
knowledge (Khurana, 2010). Other professionals engage with or debate moral
questions among themselves (Heimer, 1999; Binder, 2007; Howard-Grenville
et al., 2017) but hive off engagement in public debates to peripheral
occupations such as policymakers, lawyers, or ethicists. For example,
scientists have debated among themselves plural moral perspectives about
their work, such as whether to integrate safety features in genetic engineering
(Fredrickson, 2001) and nanotechnology (McCarthy and Kelty, 2010) or whether
to include environmental considerations in chemistry (Howard-Grenville et al.,
2017). But such professionals generally remain silent in public moral, ethical,
and policy debates. For example, when biologists agreed that genetic engineer-
ing was to be regulated to ensure its responsible practice, they outsourced the
definition and implementation of biosafety regulation and governance to exter-
nal institutions such as the National Institutes of Health (Fredrickson, 2001).
Similarly, while many American physicists were profoundly ambivalent
toward the use of physics for warfare, those who wished to be publicly
vocal about their dissent left physics and joined separate public interest
organizations (Moore, 1996). In this case, internal dissent was resolved by
dissenters moving outside the boundaries of science—e.g., outside of
laboratories or the American Physics Society—into external public interest
organizations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists. Because the expression of moral pluralism is seen as
degrading and a threat to professional claims to integrity and objectivity
(Douglas, 1970; Abbott, 1988), professionals may seek to maintain claims to
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integrity and objectivity over the open, public debate of their values. As Moore
(1996: 1594) noted about physicists who left their discipline, ‘‘Activist scientists
had to be politically critical of science without suggesting that the content of
scientific knowledge might be tainted by non-scientific values.’’
Yet silence on moral matters threatens professional control. When
professionals silence their moral values, they can lose central and competent
members who desire to engage with the morality of their practices (Moore,
1996; Anteby, 2013). In addition, professionals relinquish their capacity to
engage in and influence the broader debates concerning the morality and
responsibility of their work (Freidson, 2001).
Moreover, silence is not always possible, especially when the fundamental
activity is itself contested. Professional work often expands into domestic, inti-
mate, and communal activities that are imbued with moral meaning, such as
healthcare, childcare, human reproduction, organ procurement, and end-of-life
care. This situation requires ongoing definition of how personal and intimate
matters should be managed, e.g., traded or handled through paid experts
(Hochschild, 2003; Healy, 2004; Almeling, 2007), and ongoing discussion of the
legitimacy of professionals to participate in and define these activities (Radin,
1996).
In these cases, key stakeholders’ resistance to the third-party handling of
intimate and personal matters can threaten professionals’ capacity to control
their work. Consumers resisted engaging in the contracting of life insurance
when they considered the practice to be immoral (Zelizer, 1983), donors and
suppliers can resist participating in the provision of goods such as blood or
organs if they view the practice as morally ambiguous (Healy, 2004), and
governments regularly create legal barriers to the third-party handling of per-
sonal matters (Radin, 1996).
To overcome this resistance, professionals have sought to develop moral
legitimacy for their practices: the perceived conformity to external and institu-
tionalized expectations of what is right or appropriate (Suchman, 1995). They
have done so by adopting justifications, discourses, and symbols from external
sources of moral authority such as the church, the state, or long tradition
(Zelizer, 1983; Elsbach, 1994; Healy, 2004; Chan, 2009; Anteby, 2010; Turco,
2012). For example, early life-insurance professionals overcame resistance to
the monetization of death by enlisting authoritative actors such as religious
leaders to present life insurance as morally superior to extant practices, which
often left families destitute (Zelizer, 1983). When removing cadavers, funeral
workers have long mobilized symbols associated with home and religion
(Barley, 1983) to distance bereaved families from association with impersonal
third-party work.
These accounts are generally configured to fit existing moralities (Elsbach,
1994; Chan, 2009) by presenting one set of practices as morally desirable and
by devaluing alternatives (Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008; Anteby, 2010).
This univocal framing of one set of activities as moral in opposition to other
practices provides effective resources for establishing the superiority of an
activity for external stakeholders (Weber, Heinze and DeSoucey, 2008; Anteby,
2010). For example, Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey (2008) explored how grass-
fed beef producers presented their production as authentic, sustainable, and
natural while presenting conventional production as manipulated, exploitative,
and artificial. This enabled the emergence of an alternative producer identity
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and connected grass-fed beef producers to consumers, facilitating the creation
of a stable market and occupation for dedicated producers. Similarly, in their
pursuit of legitimacy, full-body procurement professionals developed practices
emphasizing ethical and respectful handling of human bodies, thus differentiat-
ing themselves from operators using less socially acceptable approaches
(Anteby, 2010).
But relying on univocal and externally defined accounts of morality can
threaten professional control. Univocal and externally defined accounts are gen-
erally decoupled from the complex, multiple, and often shifting internal goals,
practices, and values of a profession (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Turco, 2012).
The ongoing tensions arising from this decoupling can threaten a profession’s
mission. For example, as insurance providers successfully redefined life insur-
ance as altruistic, insurance professionals became enduringly stigmatized for
their morally ambivalent position as ‘‘salaried missionaries,’’ profiting from the
altruistic practice of providing for widows and orphans (Zelizer, 1983). Similarly,
studying a company that mobilized claims of altruism to legitimize the commer-
cialization of motherhood services and products, Turco (2012) showed how
employees who taught birthing and new parent classes found it difficult to dis-
tance themselves from the organization’s altruistic discourse. Placing the altru-
istic relationship with their clients above their commercial relationship, these
professionals refused to act as salespersons for the organization’s expensive
products, ultimately undermining its commercial mission (Turco, 2012). Thus
anchoring moral justifications to external and generally univocal sources of
authority can threaten professionals’ control of their multiple and complex goals
and their means for achieving these goals.
Taken together, these works highlight that whether eschewing statements
about the morality of their work or adopting externally defined and univocal
moral accounts, professionals rely on external sources of authority and thereby
relinquish their capacity to control the moral definition of their work. Exercising
such control would require developing some form of authoritative control over
the debates related to the morality of professional endeavors—some form of
moral authority.
Expanding Expert Authority to Moral Matters
If moral legitimacy is the capacity to conform to institutionalized expectations
of what is right, moral authority is the capacity to define what is right. As with
any form of power, the exercise of moral authority is grounded in specific
resources. For professionals, these resources may be abstract knowledge
about morals, since the extended control of knowledge is central to the estab-
lishment of claims to expert authority (Abbott, 1988; Larson, 2013).
While early professions such as the clergy, medicine, or law commanded
some amount of moral authority among their constituents, such authority was
grounded in the character of their practitioners—in their professed, apparent,
and generally socially enforced altruism and personal dedication to serving the
community (Brint, 1996). Imber (2008: xviii) described how the moral authority
of U.S. physicians between the 1860s and 1970s was shaped by the clergy’s
insistence that ‘‘the physician was and would be a person of integrity and high
moral character.’’ The character of the early medical professional was central
to the patient–physician relationship and to patients’ ability to place their trust
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in the individual practitioners. The need for trust in practitioners’ benevolence
was shaped by their possession of ‘‘guilty knowledge’’ (Hughes, 1971): knowl-
edge of their clients’ sins, diseases, or illegalities. A personal service ideal may
have also enabled clients’ trust despite a dearth of technical expertise. For
instance, Imber (2008) detailed how in the early years of the medical profes-
sion, the trustworthy doctor’s ability to alleviate anxiety about illness and death
may have been as important to patients as the therapeutic efficacy of medical
practice. To cite one pastor’s sermon: ‘‘a few kind words of spiritual counsel
[on the part of the physician] kindly offered, have in some instances of this sort,
done much to tranquilize the system, where the best pharmaceutical agents
have failed’’ (Imber, 2008: 16).
With the increasing employment of professionals in organizations and the
emergence of professions grounded in rational knowledge, the emphasis on
the direct, unmediated relationship between client and benevolent professional
decreased. ‘‘Social trustee’’ professionalism decreased as ‘‘expert professional-
ism’’ expanded (Brint, 1996), with engineers, scientists, accountants, and busi-
ness consultants embodying the turn toward expertise. These trends, along
with the development of professional service firms, led to a model of profes-
sionalism grounded in expertise and routines, as increased exposure to market
and efficiency logics raised questions about professionals’ capacity and willing-
ness to adhere to traditional altruistic orientations (Freidson, 2001; Leicht and
Fennell, 2008). Professionals appear to have moved from a ‘‘legitimacy of char-
acter to a legitimacy of technique’’ (Abbott, 1988: 190). Even when claims to
technical expertise entail an implicit moral claim to superior service, they rein-
force the legitimacy of technique over altruism (Nelsen and Barley, 1997).
Scientists are certainly closer to a model of expert professionalism than to that
of social trustee professionalism. Indeed, in their pursuit of professional author-
ity, scientists have generally defined themselves as technical experts and mobi-
lized logics of rational efficiency (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985; Biagioli, 1993).
They would thus appear less likely than professionals such as doctors to
ground their authority in altruism and more likely to ground their authority in
their expertise.
It is possible to ground authority about moral matters in expert knowledge
about morals. For professionals, whose authoritative claims rely on the control
of expert knowledge, to ground moral authority in expertise entails including
knowledge about morals within their jurisdictional boundaries. As moral
debates occur at a social level, knowledge about moral issues related to a pro-
fessional activity is generally well developed by adjacent occupations such as
policymakers, lawyers, or ethicists. Thus developing expert knowledge about
morals entails claiming knowledge from these adjacent occupations as well
as applying this knowledge to professional problems. Historians, philosophers,
sociologists of science, bioethicists, lawyers, and policymakers have
provided ample sources of knowledge for scientists about moral and ethical
perspectives on their work (e.g., Merton, 1973; Shapin and Shaffer, 1985). In
turn, scientists have variously embraced or criticized these ethical perspectives
depending on their specific interests (Mitroff, 1974; Gieryn, 1999; Slayton,
2007; Dunn and Jones, 2010; Shapin, 2010) but without necessarily trying to
control this knowledge.
One challenge to the extended control of knowledge in morally contested
work involves claiming knowledge about both sides of a moral debate.
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Claiming knowledge about plural moral positions challenges occupations’ ten-
dency to develop (Durkheim, 1976; Van Maanen and Barley, 1984) and display
(Abbott, 1988) shared norms and values. Displays of unity are central to profes-
sional authority, as they contribute to the outside recognition of a claim to con-
trol a work domain (Abbott, 1988). Professional jurisdictions, as clear public
demarcations between archetypes (Lamont and Molnar, 2002), are linked to
public perceptions of homogeneity (Abbott, 1988). As Abbott (1988: 81) noted,
‘‘In the public arena, the nature of discourse about jurisdiction is sharply
constrained. Public discourse must concern homogeneous groups. All doctors
are equivalent, all nurses are equivalent. . . . Public jurisdiction concerns an
abstract space of work, in which there exist clear boundaries between homo-
geneous groups. Differences of public jurisdiction are differences between
archetypes.’’
Such displays of homogeneity are themselves representations of internally
negotiated settlements around shared norms and values about work (Van
Maanen and Barley, 1984), and moral pluralism challenges this internal cohe-
sion (Moore, 1996; Howard-Grenville et al., 2017). Voicing diverse moral
positions may be viewed as moralizing and dismissive of an occupation’s more
pragmatic goals (Anteby, 2013; Howard-Grenville et al., 2017). While moral plu-
ralism is likely to be present in all organizational and occupational groups that
reflect plural societies, normative silence may often be preferable for
dissenters wishing to retain group membership (Jackall, 1988; Anteby, 2013).
Thus the expression of moral pluralism may be possible only if professionals
can reduce the gaps or tensions between the different moral frames (Howard-
Grenville et al., 2017) or develop a shared orientation toward work beyond the
plurality of moral values. The shared orientation toward work would allow for
the maintenance of cohesion beyond moral dissent. Professionals may have
incentives to develop this shared orientation to work if this means that they
can maintain membership in their desired occupational group or if cohesion can
be leveraged as a resource for strengthening professional boundaries by
displaying homogeneity in public jurisdictional claims.
In this article, I examine a case in which professionals engaging in morally
complex work, stem cell research, articulated and mobilized their moral plural-
ism to develop expert control over the moral definition of their work. After
detailing the methods, I unpack empirically how these professionals translated
the plurality of their moral values into expert knowledge about morals and then
mobilized this knowledge to craft claims to expert authority in public debates.
The analysis highlights how cohesion across plural moral values was
maintained in practice, thereby allowing professionals to present a unified front
as experts in public debates. I discuss the implications of these findings for our
understanding of professions’ moral foundations and of the role of moral plural-
ism for the management of complex work activities.
METHODS
The Moral Debate Related to Stem Cell Research
In 1998, Jamie A. Thomson first announced the successful derivation of
hESCs, creating excitement among scientists. Stem cells, also known as pluri-
potent cells, were viewed from the beginning as a crucial new tool for medicine
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and science. These cells can develop into any type of cell in the body, which
means they hold the potential to create any type of human tissue. This potency
generated hope for regenerative medicine and for applications in cures for
diseases involving cell disorders such as Parkinson’s disease, Alzheimer’s dis-
ease, and various types of cancer. The purely scientific promise was equally
high. By starting with a common cell model, scientists could achieve variations
through experimental methods that could then provide information about how
human cells transform into diseased cells. Finally, under specific conditions,
stem cells can be grown indefinitely, forming cell lines that can be shared
among different scientific teams, making them a uniquely convenient tool to
study cell and human evolution.
However, the news revived debates about whether, when, and how person-
hood should be attributed to embryos as well as whether, and under what
conditions, human embryos could be used for research purposes. U.S. federal
funding for research on fetal tissues, including embryos, had been banned
since 1995 through the Dickey–Wicker amendment, although privately funded
research was allowed in many states. The amendment did not cover human
embryonic stem cells as they had not been discovered at the time. In 2001,
amidst renewed public concern and activism, the federal government enacted
a stronger federal funding ban covering research deriving or using hESC lines,
except for a small number of lines created prior to 2001.
In response to the controversy and federal ban, several scientists—either
pioneers in their field, such as Thomson, or directors of prominent laboratories,
such as Douglas Melton—engaged with the public disputes. In the media and
in public policy settings, these scientists developed moral justifications for their
activities. Their early interventions generally presented stem cell research as a
moral imperative for the advancement of medicine. In an interview with The
New York Times (NYT) on January 24, 2006, Melton said, ‘‘Fertilized eggs have
the potential, under certain circumstances, to become a living person. There
are many who believe that there is a moral imperative to use that potential to
try to help living sick people. I hold with them.’’ Efforts to define stem cell sci-
ence as moral also included the definition of culturally acceptable practices.
Scientists created the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR), a
nonprofit organization ‘‘established to promote and foster the exchange and
dissemination of information and ideas relating to stem cells.’’ The society
defined and promulgated guidelines for ethical research. The National Academy
of Sciences (NAS), a society of scientists with the goal to provide advice on
matters related to science and technology, also defined several criteria for ethi-
cal practice and recommended the constitution of independent institutional
Embryonic Stem Cell Oversight Committees to oversee the respect of these
criteria by all research centers.
In 2007, four laboratories announced the discovery of a method for
reprogramming adult cells into a pluripotent stage. The cells resulting from the
reprogramming process were named induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSCs).
The following year, Science Magazine named reprogramming ‘‘the break-
through of the year.’’ As scientists developed alternative cell models bypassing
the use of embryos, they also expressed alternative moral views about stem
cell research, defining the use of embryos for research as morally complex.
Shinya Yamanaka, the first scientist to claim successful reprogramming and
later winner of the Nobel Prize in Medicine and Physiology for the discovery,
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publicly expressed a personal reluctance to use human embryos for research:
‘‘When I saw the embryo, I suddenly realized there was such a small difference
between it and my daughters. . . . I thought, we can’t keep destroying embryos
for our research. There must be another way’’ (NYT, December 11, 2007).
Several pioneers in hESC research followed suit in expressing the moral diffi-
culty of stem cell research.2 Thomson himself noted the moral complexity of
hESC research in a November 22, 2007 NYT article: ‘‘If human embryonic stem
cell research does not make you at least a little bit uncomfortable, you have not
thought about it enough.’’
This public debate provides the context for investigating the links between
moral pluralism and professional authority. How did scientists come to articu-
late publicly their moral differences? How did this shape their capacity to con-
trol and advance their work?
In situ observations of workplaces can provide explanations for how macro-
level contests are shaped by local interactions and meanings. Although authori-
tative claims—such as those of stem cell scientists—are rhetorical, the
resources for establishing such claims are negotiated on the ground through
everyday activities and interactions. While the analysis of public representations
by a profession allows us to capture its rhetorical claims, the study of the
everyday interpretations and activities of members of a profession allows us to
explore the construction of these claims. As the place where the work of sci-
ence is performed (Barley and Bechky, 1994; Owen-Smith, 2001), the labora-
tory is a privileged space to study such situated interpretations, actions, and
interactions (Latour, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 1999). To study the construction of
stem cell scientists’ claims about the morality of their work, I chose a major
laboratory at the center of the stem cell community: Med Lab (a pseudonym).
Med Lab
Med Lab is a large laboratory that gathers pioneering researchers in hESCs and
iPSCs. In addition, several Med Lab scientists have been actively engaged in
the public debates related to stem cell research. It thus constitutes a micro-
cosm of stem cell scientists and an ideal setting to examine how professionals
might address the moral complexity of their work.
Med Lab was founded when Eastern University’s medical school offered to
help the principal investigator (PI), Gary, develop a privately funded facility for
researching and deriving stem cells from human embryos.3 Med Lab became
one of the early laboratories to obtain, create, study, and experiment with
hESCs in the early 2000s. It also became one of the four laboratories to pioneer
the invention of reprogramming in 2007.
2 Stem cells obtained from different methods, such as derivation from embryos and
reprogramming, are not perfect substitutes and thus represent different experimental and medical
potentials. For instance, the process to obtain iPSCs involves injecting viruses that create more
risks for patients for direct transplantation than hESCs. At the same time, cells used to create
iPSCs can be sourced directly from diseased patients, potentially addressing compatibility issues.
Characterizations of the cells have also highlighted several differences. Scientific research and
debate over the characteristics, scientific merits, and medical promises of both cell types are
ongoing (e.g., Pera, 2011).
3 All names are pseudonyms.
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Gary and several lab members actively participated in public and policy
debates. Gary participated in the founding of the ISSCR and the creation of the
guidelines for ethical practices. One senior scientist, Walter, organized several
courses and workshops on ethics in collaboration with other stem cell laborato-
ries and a university bioethics department. Several lab members spoke in the
media and at university conferences about the ethics of their work. In addition,
Gary set up a technical facility (hereafter named TechCore) for banking and dis-
tributing stem cell lines and for providing technical training to all requesting lab-
oratories at Eastern University and beyond.4
In terms of biological research, Med Lab specializes in developmental biol-
ogy and genetic blood disorders. The lab is affiliated with a research hospital
and focuses on basic research and translational research—research that is
developed with a view to medical applications. The medical environment
provides direct access to human tissues such as surplus embryos from in vitro
fertilization (IVF) or tissues necessary for the study of disease-specific cells. At
the time of this fieldwork in 2009 and 2010, Med Lab had five distinct teams:
Embryology, TechCore, Blood, Cancer, and Reprogramming. Embryology spe-
cialized in experimental research on embryos and hESCs. TechCore was a tech-
nical facility for banking stem cell lines, specifying and diffusing experimental
protocols, organizing training, and performing technical tasks related to hESCs
for requesting laboratories. Blood and Cancer were dedicated to the study of
disease-related biological processes using human or animal stem cell models.
Reprogramming emerged as a new team in 2007.
At that time, the experimental work with human embryos and with some
hESC lines was not approved for federal funding. (Some of the work still
remains closed to such funding.) As this work was commonly designated by
scientists as ‘‘non-presidentially approved,’’ it is generally labeled as ‘‘non-
presidential’’ or ‘‘NP’’ work. NP work is supported by a mix of private donations
and university funding and is generally conducted by Embryology and TechCore
team members. The two teams work in clearly demarcated laboratory spaces
with dedicated equipment and workers. Most of the equipment—fridges,
microscopes, centrifuges, incubators, biosafety hoods, and analysis
machines—is duplicated in the demarcated spaces to comply with federal
funding requirements. Experimental supplies such as pipettes, pipette tips,
petri dishes, gloves, containers, analysis kits, and reagents are also purchased
through separate grants and stored in separate areas. The laboratory manager
keeps a detailed accounting of the purchases, submitting to yearly compliance
audits by the university and the hospital. To ensure proper segregation, all
materials dedicated to NP work are clearly identified with bright NP labels. The
work performed by Reprogramming, Blood, and Cancer is generally eligible for
and largely funded by federal grants. Although some federal restrictions on
research funding were lifted in 2009, the laboratory has nonetheless
maintained its NP facilities as significant amounts of hESC work remain closed
to federal funding. For example, the banking and use of many hESC lines
remain unauthorized for funding, and the creation of new lines from human
embryos remains similarly unauthorized.
4 Stem cell scientists facilitated work with stem cell lines after the 2001 funding ban by organizing
free banking and distribution of stem cell lines for requesting laboratories.
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At the time of the study, the laboratory was home to 43 scientists including
senior research scientists, postdoctoral fellows, Ph.D. students, and
technicians. The daily supervision of the laboratory was done by Walter, the
most senior scientist beneath the PI, Gary. Table 1 shows a breakdown of labo-
ratory members by gender and role.
Data Collection
I adopted a grounded-theory approach to data collection. I began a long-term
immersion in the laboratory as I tried to understand how members of the same
occupation worked and collaborated using tools that embodied diverse values
(in this case, stem cells). As scientists indicated that they used their under-
standing of the moral issues about their work to engage in more public debates
outside the lab boundaries, I collected data about their efforts in public arenas
and, later, archival data about scientists’ public pronouncements at the field
level.
Data for this paper are thus drawn from observations and interviews issuing
from ethnographic immersion in Med Lab and supplemented with observations
of talks and conferences and archival data at the field level. This mixed archival
and field methods approach is useful to understand in depth the dynamics of
scientific communities (e.g., Grodal, 2018). Table 2 provides a summary of the
data collected.
Ethnographic observations in Med Lab. I conducted observations for two
periods over 17 months between March 2009 and July 2010 with a three-
month break. The study began a few weeks before the federal ban on stem
cell research was lifted and six months before the first additional hESC lines
would be approved for federal funding. Stem cell research remained subject to
funding restrictions, regulatory uncertainty, judicial challenges, and public
debate; see the timeline in the Online Appendix (http://journals.sagepub.com/
doi/suppl/10.1177/00018392211011441).
To gain access, I presented the project to all laboratory members during two
lab meetings. The project was presented as an inquiry into their interpretations
of, and practices related to, their research models. Once granted access, I
spent about half of the weekdays in the lab observing bench work, attending
weekly meetings, and participating in informal events such as lunches, breaks,
and celebratory events. I shadowed scientists across all roles and teams, from
one to seven days each. I took extended field notes of all observations: the
experimental tasks performed; the technical, ethical, and legal explanations
Table 1. Breakdown of Med Lab Members per Role and Gender (N = 43)
Female Male Total
PI 0% (0) 2% (1) 2% (1)
Postdoctoral fellow/senior scientist 12% (5) 37% (16) 49% (21)
Ph.D. student 7% (3) 7% (3) 14% (6)
Technician 21% (9) 14% (6) 35% (15)
Total 40% (17) 60% (26) 100% (43)
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volunteered by scientists at the bench about their tasks; and the interactions
among lab members. Whenever possible, I took verbatim notes. Observations
and hundreds of informal discussions at the bench generated information about
how moral perspectives were embedded in everyday work—why and how
scientists decided to work with research models, how they perceived the tech-
nical and moral benefits and difficulties of these objects, how they overcame
these difficulties, and how they justified their experimental decisions. Overall,
observations yielded about 1,000 pages of detailed field notes.
Trust is notably difficult to establish with elite professionals (Ho, 2009;
Harrington, 2015), particularly when those elites engage in contested practices.
Laboratory immersion enabled the development of trust with several members
Table 2. Description of Data
Data Sources Detailed Description
Time Span Covered
by the Data Use in Analysis
Observations in Med Lab Observations of benchwork
and lab meetings
Participation in lunches and
laboratory events
Discussions and short
interviews at the bench


















choices (hESCs, iPSCs, or
both) and the motives or
values presented in
support of their choices
Allowed reconstruction of
the lab’s history since 1998
Observations of talks
and conferences
24 talks given for ethics and
policy course at Eastern
University
Two talks given at cultural
and religious societies by
scientists
One talk by opponent of the
use of human embryos for
research
2009–2010 Provided information on
public self-presentations
and displays of expertise
by professionals associated
with Med Lab (scientists,
lawyers, policy makers,
and ethicists)
Archival data News articles:




NAS and ISSCR guidelines




New England Journal of
Medicine), publication data
(Web of Knowledge)
1998–2010 Enriched analysis with
contextual and historical
elements
Provided detailed insight on
rhetorical arguments used
in the stem cell debate
beyond Med Lab and the
evolution of the debate
over time
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and facilitated observations, informal discussions, and the formal interviews.
Secondary access, the acceptance of an observer by members of an observed
community, was renegotiated individually beyond the initial laboratory
meetings: I asked each scientist if they would agree to be observed before
shadowing them. Formal interviews were conducted after several months of
observations and set up with individual scientists after I had shadowed them
for several days and could understand their work.
Interviews. I conducted 30 open-ended interviews with scientists across all
levels. To facilitate discussion of moral preferences and commitments, I relied
on scientists’ prior experiences, decision points, and perspectives on their cur-
rent experimental practices. I inquired about their career decisions before and
during their tenure in Med Lab, about their decisions to work with a variety of
research models, and about how their personal views of these research
models shaped decisions to work with a particular model or not. The interviews
were partly retrospective and covered the period from 1998 to 2010. Although
I was not present at the time of the lab’s first creation of hESCs and iPSCs, the
accounts of the inventors, the laboratory director, and other members present
at the time provided ample data about the context of the inventions and the
decisions made at the time (see the Online Appendix for a timeline of the
events and the data collection).
The interview questions were meant to elicit open conversation about how
the scientists’ values shaped their micro-level decisions at work—how these
values infused their everyday work. Interview questions included the following:
How did scientists decide to apply to and work for a stem cell laboratory?
Which experimental models did they use for their research? How had they
decided to work with the research models they were currently using? Had they
refused to develop or use research models or techniques? How would they
describe their current position in the stem cell debate? How did their views
evolve over time? Formal interviews lasted between 40 minutes (for junior lab-
oratory members) and two hours (generally with more senior scientists), with
an average of one hour. All interviews were recorded and transcribed.
Observations of talks and conferences. In addition, I attended 26
presentations and courses on stem cell science and bioethics involving Med
Lab members as co-organizers, presenters, or participants. Other presenters
included scientists, bioethicists, policymakers, lobbyists, and physicians. I also
attended one talk by an opponent of stem cell research. I took extensive
fieldnotes, mostly verbatim, of the talks and ensuing discussions. These
presentations allowed me to gather data on scientists’ self-presentations out-
side the laboratory as well as the arguments and rhetoric of their allies.
Archival data. Press articles provided additional sources to locate situated
actions in their macro-level context. I gathered over 2,000 press articles from
three newspapers that provided extensive coverage of the research and the
debate and presented a diversity of views over the 1998–2010 period: The
New York Times, The Christian Science Monitor, and a local newspaper in
Eastern City. I read over 200 articles from this selection, focusing on the
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quotes and interviews of scientists, policymakers, bioethicists, and clergy
members. The 2005, 2007, 2008, and 2010 Research Advisory Committee
guidelines for stem cell practice at the NAS provided information about
scientists’ self-regulatory efforts. I also read several op-eds from opponents to
stem cell research and reconstructed the policy decisions of the 1990s and
early 2000s that led to policy restrictions.
Data Analysis
The data analysis was ongoing alongside data collection. I followed a grounded-
theory approach of theorizing from data through analytic induction (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967; Katz, 2001; Charmaz, 2014), observing openly at first, then navi-
gating iteratively between the field, collected data, and emerging categories of
interest. First, I inductively coded the interviews and observations, identifying
accounts and justifications expressed by scientists. I isolated when scientists
provided moral accounts about their work. Some scientists emphasized that
work decisions were driven by the pursuit of science. For instance, Sam, a
postdoctoral fellow, explained his decision to move to the Reprogramming
group: ‘‘I had some things on my mind that I was interested in, then I just
decided to throw that technology at those things and see what came out.’’ In
contrast, other accounts highlighted how decisions were shaped by moral
preferences. For example, Roni, another postdoctoral fellow, narrated his deci-
sion to conduct research in reprogramming through his preference not to work
with human embryos: ‘‘If reprogramming [was not possible], I would have
focused on adaptation of some germ cell or gone to stem cells to make more
pluripotent cells, rather than deriving human embryonic stem cells. . . .
Because I don’t want to destroy eggs.’’
I then coded these moral accounts more specifically. Most of the moral
values cited by scientists were values that commonly circulate as markers of
professional science, such as universalism (Merton, 1973), rationality (Merton,
1973; Bagioli, 1993), or medical care (Dunn and Jones, 2010). Several scientists
said that their role was to promote rational knowledge and understanding.
Others emphasized that they conceived their professional role and decisions as
driven by the search for medical knowledge and progress. I organized the dif-
ferent accounts around these main categories cited by scientists. Collectively,
these accounts also showed that scientists translated their personal choices
and preferences in the language of professional knowledge.
In addition, scientists discussed a plurality of moral perspectives, which gen-
erally fell into one of two broad camps, and located themselves in one or the
other. For example, one scientist explained that Med Lab members either val-
ued pure science—the pursuit of new knowledge regardless of its potential
applications—or valued science applied to medicine. He said that Med Lab
scientists located themselves in one of the two perspectives and concluded,
‘‘I’m definitely in the ‘basic science’ camp within the lab.’’ I organized the
accounts along the different oppositions provided by the scientists.
Several lab members noted that their effort to understand and articulate the
moral issues about their work related to their public commitments. For this rea-
son, I followed their involvement outside the laboratory, in public talks and
courses, and examined how statements made outside the laboratory related to
those made within it. This allowed me to analyze scientists’ moral accounts
Evans 15
from their elaboration at the micro level to their mobilization as publicly authori-
tative statements.
Following principles of analytic induction (Katz, 2001), I analyzed how these
data fit the models relating to morals and professions. The data were consis-
tent with the literature showing how moral values are integrated in the every-
day interpretations, actions, and interactions of professionals (e.g., Nelsen and
Barley, 1997; Anteby 2010; Turco, 2012). The data deviated from these models
in that lab members voiced plural moral values, although no scientist left the
laboratory based on their values, and lab members continued collaborating
across values and research projects.
I thus explored whether and how scientists’ pluralism related to their rela-
tively autonomous status and to their pursuit of jurisdictional control. The data
fit the model of jurisdictional boundary negotiation: lab members developed
abstract knowledge about morals, applied it to their tasks, and mobilized it to
develop authority over a task area—that of defining the morality of their work.
The plural nature of the knowledge mobilized was consistent with the model of
professional expansion through knowledge control (e.g., Larson, 2013). The
data departed from this model in that the knowledge related to the moral
aspects rather than the technical aspects of professional work. Moral pluralism
is notably difficult to maintain within one professional space, so the final analy-
sis focused on how moral pluralism was maintained within the space of
science.
CRAFTING MORAL AUTHORITY
The empirical analysis presented in the following sections elaborates one
mechanism for developing professional authority in moral debates, identifying
three main steps through which professionals can secure moral authority over
their work. The model depicted in Figure 1 begins with the need to provide a
coherent moral account for a contested practice in the presence of plural moral
values among professionals. To secure space in their profession for a plurality
of values, these professionals (1) collectively translated their moral values into
knowledge about these values, (2) applied this knowledge to their work while
maintaining cohesion beyond their moral pluralism, and (3) mobilized this
applied knowledge and demonstrable cohesion to develop authoritative claims
in public moral debates. The outcome of these claims was the development of
moral authority.
Demand for a Coherent Moral Account in the Presence of Moral Pluralism
Med Lab scientists reported that they began to articulate moral values about
their work first as a response to outside stakeholders (such as policymakers,
the media, and members of the public) seeking a moral account for their
practices and second as lab members became aware that they held a plurality
of moral views about their work.
Demand for a moral account from stakeholders. From the beginning of
his position at Med Lab in early 2000, as an early scientist in the nascent field,
Gary received requests from legislators and the media seeking perspectives on







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the moral debate. He agreed to respond, considering that he could mobilize his
scientific knowledge and background as a physician:
I was drawn into [the policy debate] because I had the knowledge base and the
expertise, and because I was a physician scientist, and I think that had a lot to do
with it. And so I can speak about the scientific realities around 1998 of nuclear trans-
fer, and cloning, and Dolly, and human embryos, and stem cells, and try to weave
together a story of why that basic science was going to, one day, be important for
human medicine. And after all, that’s really what compels public policy, the funda-
mental drive that one of the great noble callings of humanity is to release suffering
through medicine.
Gary also noted how early training in ethics helped him articulate a moral
perspective:
I have a very good foundation in the basics of the major ethical frameworks, classical
utilitarian, classical deontological, all the different sorts of tensions. And so that has
served me very, very well in the discussions with a lot of bioethicists in thinking
about the various views on the fundamental concepts of the early embryo. . . . I’m
pretty fluent with the fundamental tenets of the arguments. And so that, coupled to
my scientific understanding, has made me more comfortable than maybe some of
my colleagues are in going out and getting involved.
Consequently, he joined policy discussions at the state senate, gave interviews
in the media, and co-wrote articles and op-eds defending the ethicality of the
use of human embryos for research. He also participated in the development
of the International Society for Stem Cell Research (ISSCR), whose goals
included the promotion of stem cell research, the definition of guidelines for
ethical research, and advocacy for the adoption of these guidelines by the NAS
and the federal government. As the preceding quotes illustrate, Gary’s early
justifications for using human embryos for research were grounded in secular
philosophy and in the importance of science and medicine for humanity.
While Med Lab scientists already had some knowledge about ethics, the
demand for further justification of their practices led them to develop further
knowledge. Walter, the most senior scientist of the laboratory, detailed how
the demands for providing public moral accounts pushed him to study the
ethics of his work:
I had to. I was asked. I was asked to go to [the state government]. If I was asked to
go to Institut Pasteur and give a talk, I’m going to study before I go to the talk. That
would be ridiculous, to just show up, right? This is why I say that the part of my brain
that thinks about these things is no different than the part of my brain that thinks
about science. How could I go unprepared to something that I knew was going to be
mainly about theology, philosophy, and not understanding the framework or policy in
the state and in the country, and where I thought it could go? Or where I thought it
should go? And so it’s just all been part of the same thing. And so you study because
you want to know, and because it might help you to understand where you are going.
Moral pluralism among professionals. At the same time, the laboratory
had recruited scientists holding a variety of moral views about stem cell
research. Some scientists had honed their views through personal experience
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or research. For instance, Nadia, a Ph.D. student working with hESCs,
explained that she had considered these issues while writing her master’s the-
sis on the ethics of stem cell research. Other scientists had developed their
views through their religious or cultural affiliations. Many scientists joined the
laboratory with a view that the pursuit of embryonic stem cell research was
morally right. For instance, Walter considered it a moral duty to seek cures
through the research of human embryonic stem cells. But several other
scientists considered that stem cell research should aim to bypass the use of
human embryos. Although they had decided to join the lab, they considered
that they would not work with human embryos or eggs.
Thus several members diverged from the early perspectives offered by Gary
and other scientists involved in the public debate. Walter recalled the first time
the divergence was openly voiced and acknowledged in the lab, during a 2003
policy meeting called by the state senate:
Because it was a public, open testimony day, the whole lab came. . . . And it was
assumed that everybody was personally okay with hES cell research. People joked
around, made comments about some of the testimony. Well, it turned out that there
were a couple of people in the lab who were offended by the tone of the commen-
tary, and that they actually were personally opposed to human embryonic stem cell
research on moral grounds, and we just didn’t have any idea. It was just something
we took for granted. . . . And so, they had made a clear decision in their mind that
they were interested in research, but they weren’t going to be involved in the human
part. And we just didn’t know about that. And of course, people are free to believe in
whatever they want, but coming to that realization was an important one, because it
was taking things for granted that we shouldn’t take for granted in terms of our inter-
personal relations.
The tension between expectations for a coherent moral account on the part of
the laboratory and the presence of plural values among the lab members moti-
vated them to further articulate and debate their views. Walter explained that
the surfacing of plural values at the policy meeting led him and other senior
scientists to create brown-bag ethics lunches as venues for accepting
differences among themselves: ‘‘[Following the policy meeting] we had our
first sort of ethics discussion in the laboratory, not to dissuade people from
feeling one way or another, but to recognize that we have differences.’’
Translating Moral Values into Knowledge about Morals
Through research, debates, and discussions, scientists translated their moral
values about their work into knowledge about morals. This process resulted in
the development of knowledge about a plurality of moral positions. Overall,
three sets of plural moral values about science emerged: science as secular
versus science as accommodating religion, science as a basis of medicine ver-
sus science as a basic endeavor, and science as distinctly rational versus sci-
ence as universal.
Knowledge development about plural values: Science as secular versus
science as accommodating religion. Several scientists defended science as
a secular endeavor: a project aimed at creating progress in this world. Some
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scientists invoked philosophical arguments such as utilitarianism, the philosoph-
ical perspective that focuses on maximizing the resulting good that is done in
the world. From this perspective, ethical decisions are those that maximize the
resulting good for society. Peter, the head of Embryology, detailed such a view
about stem cell research:
I regard those embryos as something very special. I don’t regard them as immediate
human beings because they’re still there in liquid nitrogen. Unless someone is going
to step forward with a uterus that’s ready to go and make them into human beings,
then they’re not. They might as well be used into something more useful.
This view was resolutely secular, locating the morality of stem cell science in
the realm of societal consensus, as opposed to religious or metaphysical
norms. These scientists favored the word ‘‘ethics’’ over ‘‘morals,’’ with one
postdoctoral fellow emphasizing that ‘‘ethics is a secular word.’’ Gary similarly
located stem cell ethics in the realm of society:
I think that there’s been a tension in our society about the sort of scientific world
view and the so-called religious world view. So it’s kind of secular and non-secular.
But I fundamentally think that they don’t have to be inconsistent. . . . And I think it
really does come down to whether or not we as a society have a strong stated inter-
est in protecting blastocysts.
Some members recalled the grounding of science in the Enlightenment, mobi-
lizing the image of the 18th-century material progress that followed religious
rule. A bioethicist associated with Med Lab presented the stem cell debate as
opposing ‘‘enlightened’’ and ‘‘pre-enlightened’ positions: ‘‘Many of the con
arguments are a reflection of the pre-enlightenment ethics. In the pre-
enlightenment period, nobody cared about consent or about who was harmed.
All that mattered was the natural order, God’s given order.’’ Another bioethicist
emphasized the primacy of secular reasoning: ‘‘One has to be aware of the reli-
gious beliefs that need to be accounted for. But I don’t believe that they add to
the discussion, to the secular argumentation.’’
Walter also developed research about societal views of stem cell research
and its materials. Using the archives of the medical school, he developed work
on the symbolism of central tools and objects of stem cell research. Because
some experiments required injecting human stem cells into animals to test
their behavior in living biological organisms, he read about historical taboos
around crossing human–animal boundaries and the creation of chimeras:
human–animal hybrids. He searched historical medical studies of teratoma—
small tumors formed by stem cells that contain different body tissues, including
bone or tooth materials. He published several papers based on this work,
developed case studies, and added this stream to the laboratory’s research
programs.
At the same time, other lab members emphasized a view of stem cell sci-
ence grounded in traditional and religious perspectives. For these scientists,
some actions could not be taken even in the name of scientific or medical prog-
ress. For some, this meant that they would be part of stem cell science but
would refuse to work with embryos. For others, this meant that they opposed
some uses of human embryos. Roni, a postdoctoral fellow, straightforwardly
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stated, ‘‘I just don’t think we should use embryos for research. We should let
them grow into fetuses and babies.’’ He noted his unchanging opposition to
using human reproductive cells: ‘‘I won’t destroy an egg, and I won’t destroy
human embryos. . . . I didn’t change my perspective on the ethical issues on
human embryonic stem cells. So, I think, my postdoc education didn’t change
my perspective much.’’ These scientists generally stated that their views were
informed by their religious affiliation or values. Sally, a postdoctoral fellow from
the Reprogramming group, noted her Catholic background and explained how
it shaped her personal view on research: ‘‘It does not bother me as long as the
embryos are surplus and would have been destroyed anyway, but I would be
opposed to creating embryos for research purposes.’’
Nine scientists noted their religious affiliation and used this to locate their
position regarding the use of human embryos for research. Six scientists noted
that their religious affiliation was a source of personal opposition to all or some
uses of human embryos.
Knowledge development about plural moral values: Science as basis for
medicine versus pure science. Several scientists justified stem cell science
through its potential contribution to medicine. Gary explicitly employed this jus-
tification and regularly emphasized the importance of translational work—the
translation of scientific findings into medical progress: ‘‘I’m in a community
where I’m thinking much more about translational work. I’m planning my career
in a much more translational way. I’ve taken on an administrative role at [the
hospital], which is fundamentally translational.’’ He acknowledged mobilizing
patient stories, and sometimes patients themselves, in public debates,
courses, and the laboratory as a motivation for audiences to engage in stem
cell research:
In this course, we brought patients into every session. I have to tell you it was pow-
erful, unbelievably powerful. [Name], the kid that 11 seconds into his first game gets
crushed up against the boards and becomes a quadriplegic. . . . He goes in, he goes,
‘‘I don’t want to walk. I just want to be able to control my bladder. This amount of
getting my bicep from here to here, which took me nine months of physical therapy,
allows me to run a wheelchair, and that’s liberating.’’ I’m telling you, you tell this to a
bunch of young scientists, it has an impact. It has a real impact.
Several scientists discussed the potential for contribution to medicine as a
motive to work with human embryonic stem cells. One Ph.D. student explicitly
considered care to be a direct justification for using hESCs: ‘‘They are just cells;
if this really benefits how we are going to cure millions of people, it’s totally jus-
tifiable.’’ Four scientists discussed illnesses in close family members as per-
sonal motives for engaging in hESC research. For example, Walter explained
his early research focus on human blood stem cells as consequent to his
father’s death from blood cancer:
It turned just this horrible story, that still pains me, into a very motivating sort of will.
And so I studied blood stem cells. I tried to understand the basis of bone marrow fail-
ure in children, and comparing it to the type of bone marrow failure that these old
men dying in the veterans’ hospital would get, and to understand the genetic
differences. And so that was all about the blood stem cell. And the more I studied
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the blood stem cell, the more I saw we didn’t know very much about it, especially
the human blood stem cell. Almost everything we know is from the mouse.
Max, a technician in the Blood group, explained his interest in stem cell science
through his experience of his brother having a brain tumor removed as a teen-
ager: ‘‘I just remember hearing the doctors say one cell had to go wrong for a
tumor to start, and that just blew my mind. . . . so I always used to think about
cancer, how that could happen. And stem cells provided the rationale for why
cancer even exists in the first place.’’ Two other scientists with dual MD/Ph.D.
degrees also discussed their exposure to patients as motives to pursue
research with the aim of finding cures.
At the same time, other members considered that the morality of research
primarily resided in the quality of its contribution to science. Hao, a postdoctoral
fellow in the Cancer group, noted that his concerns about ethics rested on the
nature of knowledge production: ‘‘There are the less obvious things like, when
are things reportable, or when are results solid enough to report them in a
paper? The rigorousness of science has an ethics to it. Because once you put it
out there, you’re putting it out there as a truth, which people often take at face
value.’’ Peter similarly refused to ethically justify research through its medical
promise: ‘‘I view research [as] to just further our understanding. I don’t think
that you necessarily need to have a very, very tight link between ‘I did this
research with this embryo and now I’m going to cure this kid with this disor-
der.’ I think it’s very disingenuous to regard the scientific process in that way.’’
Some scientists considered that the use of medicine as a justification for
research raised complexities in their responsibilities toward donors and their
families. Sam, a postdoctoral fellow in Reprogramming, drew on his work of
collecting cells from a hospitalized child with a degenerative disease to explain
that when patients gave cells to science, researchers had to emphasize that
medical progress might not come out of it, or else they would raise false hope
among patients and their families. To Sam, because the connection between
scientific progress and medical progress could not be quantified, it was prob-
lematic to use medical progress as a justification for any scientific practice:
‘‘Basically, you need to just do research, and you will never know where those
answers are going to be coming from.’’
Knowledge development about plural moral values: Science as rational
versus science as universal. Many scientists defined science as uniquely
rational, in opposition to a public that they characterized as uninformed or
biased. Scientists referred to the public using such phrases as ‘‘misinformed
public,’’ ‘‘mass hysteria,’’ ‘‘public irrationality,’’ and ‘‘enormous amount of mis-
information.’’ Ph.D. student Nadia noted, ‘‘I feel people are either uninformed
because they choose not to be informed, they are uninformed because they
are getting their information from biased sources who don’t tell them every-
thing, or they are informed, and they still have biases.’’ Another Ph.D. student,
Mel, deplored perceived shortcuts in stem cell debates: ‘‘I have been working
with embryonic stem cells for a while, and I have heard all the debates when
this came up. . . . A lot of debates go with, ‘Oh, stem cell, abortion, destroying
embryos.’ But they are just five-day cell balls; it doesn’t feel like life to me,
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compared to a running mouse.’’5 Walter considered that scientists could pro-
vide a rational perspective to counteract widespread irrationality:
[I became] more and more alarmed, especially early on in the debate, that a lot of
people with some very strange ideas were on television, but I really didn’t see any
scientists making the case, ‘‘Oh, I don’t want to make Frankenstein, actually, I just
want to study the liver.’’ And so this big, this mass hysteria erupted.
Scientists favored technical terms such as ‘‘transtemic mice’’ or ‘‘blastocyst’’
rather than terms considered more evocative such as ‘‘chimera’’ or ‘‘embryo.’’
They explained this choice as a way to avoid irrational reactions. Gary explained
his preference to use the term ‘‘blastocyst’’ over ‘‘embryo’’: ‘‘I try not to use
‘embryo’ because in the public’s lexicon, embryo means something very differ-
ent than what it does to me. It doesn’t mean a preimplantation cluster of cells
that has no recognizability as human. It means a little baby; that’s not what
we’re talking about.’’
At the same time, other members invoked an ideal of universalism, holding
that science should be inclusive of the ideas of all people and groups, regard-
less of their beliefs or sociopolitical attributes. Some scientists considered that
science did not operate separately from other institutions. Sally, a postdoctoral
fellow in Reprogramming, saw the absence of political consensus over the
issue as a marker of the uncertainties surrounding the ethics of stem cell sci-
ence: ‘‘It is hard to have an opinion anyway because so many different
countries have different policies, like Israel, you don’t know where to put the
boundary.’’ Anne, a Ph.D. student in Reprogramming, considered that research
should include everyone regardless of beliefs:
I personally think it is ethical to work on embryonic stem cells to find cures, but I rec-
ognize that a lot of people don’t, so that would be part of my reluctance to work on
that. I am looking at iPS cells to find a treatment—then, this treatment, I can see a
farsighted future where if we cure cancer and if you don’t believe in stem cell
research, you’re not invited. Clearly, it’s more complicated than that. I would much
rather work on a treatment that everyone would be able to partake in, regardless of
their moral views.
Roni noted that research also benefited from including ideas from all people:
‘‘I talk with people in church who don’t do any research, but I also talk with
stem cell scientists and non-stem-cell scientists . . . in a lot of cases, I get
many new ideas from the non-stem-cells field.’’ These scientists foregrounded
the norm of science as universal, open to diverse people and perspectives
(Merton, 1973), to make the case that stem cell science should consider ideas
from everyone.
These accounts defined two moral perspectives on stem cell science. The
first perspective defined science as a secular, rational contribution to worldly
good in the form of medicine. The second perspective defined a scientific ideal
purely focused on knowledge, universal, and inclusive of religious values. While
there were some small individual variations and nuances, human embryonic
5 Scientists and bioethicists use a 14-day-after-fertilization boundary as a rule for using human
blastocysts for research. Under 14 days there is no evidence of a distinct streak of cells, and the
blastocyst can split into twins or triplets.
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stem cell (hESC) scientists generally carried the first perspective, while induced
pluripotent stem cell (iPSC) scientists—those who worked with cells resulting
from the reprogramming process—generally carried the main elements of the
second perspective.
Collective learning across values among professionals. The dedicated
forums for debates and discussions facilitated not only the translation of moral
values into accounts about moral values but also the acceptance of the
differences among scientists. Scientists modeled the brown-bag ethics
meetings after lab meetings dedicated to discussing scientific matters. They
invited a lecturer in ethics from the medical school to manage the first
seminars. Other specialists in bioethics, philosophy, or policy were brought in
as guest speakers. Each meeting focused on a specific topic and was adver-
tised as a regular research seminar. Topics included ‘‘Where does human life
begin?,’’ ‘‘Human/non-human chimeras,’’ ‘‘International perspectives on
hESCs,’’ and ‘‘Altered nuclear transfer: An ethically valid alternative to cloning?’’
When no specialist was invited, Med Lab scientists selected bioethics or phi-
losophy papers to be discussed.
Tim, the head of TechCore, explained that the meetings allowed him to
know more about the philosophy behind his scientific decisions:
The more I read about it—the bioethics, the morality, and the philosophical papers—
it made me think about it much more deeply. And I tried to really challenge myself.
I find it interesting that a lot of people who argue in favor [of the use of embryos
for research] don’t actually argue about the fundamental philosophical questions
behind it. They argue more about the needs to help and to develop new improved
treatments. And I was never really satisfied with those arguments. I find it important
to really think about, in an objective and scientific way, why I find it acceptable to do
this type of research.
Tim also explained how these meetings taught him about opposing
perspectives:
An important experience of dealing with this was the realization we are not objective
scientists who can prove that it’s okay to work with these cells, versus religious
fanatics who are just off the chart. I share a lot with secular philosophers who are
very opposed to it [the use of human embryos] and who have [valid] arguments. I
found that important to not just ignore that aspect of the work—and not just do it
because everybody around me does it without hesitation.
Similarly, Walter highlighted how they approached their differences in moral
values through informed professional debates, just as they approached their
scientific differences:
Just as we should feel comfortable to discuss our scientific differences, we should
feel comfortable to discuss our personal differences, and that is our view of utopia:
the open exchange of thoughts and ideas without recrimination.
The discussions thus helped scientists to develop knowledge about the ethical
justifications for their moral perspectives and the justifications of opposing
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perspectives—to translate their personal moral values into knowledge about
the moral approaches to their work.
Applying Moral Knowledge to Work Practices
To ensure their position in the laboratory, scientists had to align their moral
accounts and their work. For most scientists carrying a secular, applied, and
rational view of science and focused on hESC research, the challenge was to
ensure the social acceptance of hESC research. Scientists who defended a per-
spective on science as open to religion, pure, and universal had to develop
alternative research programs to those based on human embryos. In both
cases, scientists applied their knowledge of the moral issues and debates to
their scientific production.
Knowledge application to plural work projects. In their research, hESC
practitioners applied their approach to science as secular, rational, and dedi-
cated to medicine. When they first created hESC lines from embryos, they
decided to follow the criteria for ethical practice defined by scientific and medi-
cal societies, which they considered more rational than the federal criteria. The
federal criteria for funding adopted in 2001 were based on the principle of
‘‘harm already done’’: hESC lines created prior to 2001 could be used with fed-
eral funding regardless of the process for obtaining human embryos, but lines
created after 2001 could not be used with federal funds. HESC practitioners
did not consider these criteria to be rational, as Walter noted: ‘‘If you compare
the Bush approval and the Obama approval, Bush didn’t care about the prove-
nance, or the consent, or the origin. He just said, ‘Well, if they exist, you can
use them for federal money.’ . . . I don’t really see any political basis for that,
even much less, you know, a moralistic one.’’
In contrast, scientific and medical societies defined different criteria:
embryos had to be less than 14 days old, they had to be obtained through
detailed and documented consent by donors, and the anonymity of donors had
to be guaranteed. Following these guidelines, hESC scientists developed a
detailed and documented embryo donation process based on informed consent
and donor anonymity. Peter, the head of Embryology, explained, ‘‘One big [prin-
ciple] that was ignored by Bush’s rules was the consent process used to obtain
the embryos. So [we went] through a rigorous approval process: two
institutions, two IRBs [institutional review boards], two consent forms. Our
consent forms were modeled on the ISSCR guidelines and the Institute of
Medicine guidelines.’’ The adoption of informed consent as an ethical criterion
also mobilized expertise with patients and thus the value of care. Peter empha-
sized that obtaining donor consent involved ‘‘a specific skill set’’ linked to his
hospital work as a practicing pediatrician: getting access to patients willing to
donate, providing information about the implications of donating embryos,
ensuring that the terms of the consent were understood, managing the emo-
tional aspects of the relationship, and finally documenting the process and
outcome.
When the federal funding ban was partially lifted in 2009, Peter and Walter
immediately requested approval for funding of the stem cell lines created by
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Med Lab. As the new criteria were based on individual donor consent, they
were able to push for approval. Peter explained their approach:
When the new guidelines came out, the committee that would oversee the approval
process of these lines hadn’t even formed—let alone the process by which these
lines were going to be approved . . . we knew that [donor consent] was going to be a
main issue, but we also knew that our lines would pass muster. So rather than wait
to have the committee be formed and hear the details about how to do it, we just
basically inundated them with all our paperwork, so for every line we wanted to
prove we sent all the documentations, which I had all ready to go. . . . We had very
well-documented proof of the rigorous approval process, and I think that got our foot
in the door. I think it also showed that we were eager to get it done, that we had
done it very above board, in a good way.
Most of the laboratory’s lines were approved for federal funding by December
2009; they were among 15 lines initially approved under the new regulation.
Walter noted with some satisfaction that their lines were now considered to be
ethically produced, in contrast to other lines from various provenances
approved under the 2001 guidelines. The old lines would no longer be approved
because the origin of the embryos and the ethicality of the practices used to
create the stem cell lines from these embryos could not be documented.
Knowledge about ethics was also mobilized in other ways. When deciding
to create new hESC lines, Peter decided to use ‘‘poor quality’’ embryos: those
issued through the IVF process but discarded as they were considered of insuf-
ficient quality to result in a viable birth. The strategy emphasized the connection
to medicine by mobilizing Peter’s medical background, his connection to
hospitals, and his knowledge of the IVF processes. In another example, Ph.D.
student Nadia used her knowledge of ethics and policy to decide on which
hESC lines to ground her research:
When I first started this project, I limited myself to lines that were approved at the
time, which were the old lines, and had a good potential of being approved [under
the new criteria] because this was probably going to happen, right? So I limited
myself to those lines, and luckily, those lines were the ones that had been used a lot
in the papers and the protocols that I am trying to replicate.
Thus, in ways both large and small, hESC scientists developed research
materials and practices coherent with their view of stem cell science morality
as grounded in secularism, medicine, and rationality.
At the same time, other members applied their approach to stem cell sci-
ence morality as grounded in religion, basic knowledge, and universalism. The
main outcomes were the creation of a technique for obtaining stem cells that
bypassed the use of human embryos (reprogramming), the definition of
research tools with this technique (induced pluripotent stem cells or iPSCs),
and the development of research programs based on these new tools. The
larger part of this initial work was done by Roni, who dedicated his postdoctoral
fellowship to finding a technique to reprogram human adult cells into pluripo-
tent cells, akin to embryonic stem cells. He described his decision to dedicate
his fellowship to the risky (although promising) search for an alternative to
hESCs as morally motivated: ‘‘I preferred to focus on [alternatives] rather than
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deriving hESCs, and rather than destroying eggs and then doing [nuclear] trans-
fer. Because I didn’t want to destroy eggs.’’
Other laboratories were already searching for alternatives to hESCs, but
because they did not work with hESCs, they conducted research with animal
embryonic cells. Drawing on Med Lab’s expertise, Roni was able to work
directly with human cells and thus bypass several steps in the process.
Although Med Lab scientists began the search for alternatives later than sev-
eral other labs, they announced the discovery of a reprogramming process in
2007 at the same time as three other labs. The announcement placed Med Lab
scientists among the pioneers in the new technique and ensured high visibility
for the lab.
The success motivated many members to join the emerging Reprogramming
group, which grew from one postdoctoral fellow in 2007 to 20 scientists by
2011. Although some members expressed a purely strategic interest, many
cited the program’s alignment with their personal values as motive for joining
the group. Andie, a new Ph.D. student, clearly expressed a moral preference for
working with iPSCs:
There are some fatal flaws with hESCs that would have prevented me to jump in as
wholeheartedly as I did with iPSC technology, which is that you require human
embryos to generate them. . . . I think that iPSCs bypass the moral issues that most
people have, which is if you believe that the soul is born at conception, then no one
has that issue with that because the patient survives the generation of iPSCs
whereas the embryo does not survive the generation of ES [embryonic stem] cells.
So, I would rather work on iPS cells because anyone would benefit from the thera-
peutics that would come out of it, as opposed to half the population.
Sameer, a newly recruited postdoc, said he would not have joined the lab if it
had not done research with iPSCs.
Experimental models such as cell lines constitute the basic infrastructure of
scientific production. When used by communities of researchers, they shape
these researchers’ moral practices, such as their collaborative habits of work-
ing, knowledge exchanging, and publishing (Kohler, 1994). Although only a
handful of lab members defined the different techniques for obtaining stem
cells, their actions had larger implications because they led to the emergence
of two experimental platforms in the form of tools, procedures, and trained
scientists grounded in specific values. As lab members sorted themselves into
the two research groups following their technical and moral preferences, they
participated in the emergence of two coexisting regimes of scientific produc-
tion. As Roni noted, ‘‘I don’t have any problem with deriving hESCs. It is like
drinking beer. Some people drink beer, some people drink wine. I don’t drink
beer. In our lab [there is space for] your preferences.’’
Yet the partially competing research programs did prompt tensions in the
lab. Some hESC practitioners considered iPSC research to be a loss to their
own research. Walter voiced this concern:
If you want to quantitate the people that probably would have worked with embry-
onic stem cells if it had been easier, it’s probably all of the people working with
iPSCs now, or at least a lot of them. And it’s a huge differential in number. And, you
know, that could relate to moral questions. I know that there are some institutions
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that just said, ‘‘We will not go into this work because it exposes us to too much risk.’’
But now those people are doing iPSC work like crazy.
Such tensions highlighted the need for unity across the research groups.
Ongoing collaboration across the hESC and iPSC research groups facilitated
cohesion across values.
Collaboration across values. As hESC scientists were the first lab
members to develop techniques in stem cell derivation, characterization, cul-
ture, and banking, they held knowledge and infrastructure essential to the lab.
Their knowledge was crucial for the first move into reprogramming and contin-
ued to be central to new scientists. HESC scientists shared their knowledge
with newer lab members, including those wishing to work on reprogramming.
Pam, a postdoctoral fellow from the Blood group, described how she benefited
from such knowledge for her setup:
Iris has helped me a little bit. Jason’s been pretty helpful in terms of giving me some
feedback on what limitations there might be and some concerns about translating
from mouse ES [embryonic stem] cells to human. There’s also someone in TechCore
that has great expertise with differentiation of human embryo stem cells. She’s been
working with human ES cells and doing a little bit of blood differentiation with Jerry
and me from the mouse cells. Nadia also has been helpful in terms of information
about how to treat the cells nicely and the proper way to keep your medium fresh,
that kind of thing. So I think there’s a pretty good support system.
Sam from Reprogramming acknowledged that such knowledge transfer had
been central to Med Lab’s ability to develop its reprogramming work faster
than other labs:
We happened to have some infrastructure to actually take that observation [that cells
can be reprogrammed] and just run. Because a lot of us are doctors, we have
protocols to get patient materials. We had a core facility that knew how to grow
embryonic stem cells and do their proper characterization. Those things were all in
place. And we had technology, we had pretty well-established technology for gener-
ating virus and [reprogramming] things with virus. People were already doing that in
this lab, knocking things down in human ES cells and stuff.
Exchanges between hESC and iPSC scientists also covered equipment and
supplies. Between 2007 and 2010, the work that was closed to federal funding
(the ‘‘non-presidential’’ or NP work) declined as scientists began to use iPSCs
and then as several hESC lines became open to public funding. Embryology
and TechCore had surplus capacity on their NP equipment at a time when the
growth of Reprogramming led to the overcrowding of equipment provided by
public grants. While laboratory members doing NP work could legally use only
NP equipment, all other lab members could legally use all types of equipment.
Many times, hESC scientists selectively allowed access to NP equipment to
members of other research groups. The NP thermocycler, a machine used to
perform DNA analysis, was one such important resource. The other
thermocycler was in high demand, with three or more people regularly waiting
in line to use it, and it would often break down, interrupting time-sensitive
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experiments. Peter, head of Embryology, allowed some scientists to use the
NP thermocycler when needed. He once highlighted the privilege by pointing at
a postdoctoral fellow from Reprogramming using the NP machine while three
other scientists were waiting for the other machine and noting, ‘‘She’s pretty
glad now that I let her use our machine.’’
TechCore members similarly allowed access to their NP tissue culture room
to a couple of scientists from other groups. Ph.D. student Mel transferred from
TechCore to the Cancer group but informally retained access to TechCore’s tis-
sue culture room. She explained that this access was crucial as she performed
many experiments with hESCs that had to be cultivated in a more highly sterile
environment than adult cells. TechCore had standardized processes for keeping
all workstations, supplies, and experimental agents clean and free from bacte-
rial contamination to ensure the survival and integrity of the fragile hESCs,
while the other research groups lacked such organization.
IPSC scientists who received help from hESC scientists reciprocated by
performing tasks for hESC researchers, providing supplies, and expressing grat-
itude. Several scientists gave Peter small supplies such as Pasteur pipettes or
culture plates when he ran out so that he would avoid interrupting his
experiments. Sam added cell culture tasks from hESC scientists to his own cell
culture work, a lengthy process involving removing waste from the culture
dishes and adding feed and various agents to the cells. Mel expressed her grat-
itude to TechCore scientists; she walked me to their tissue culture room, intro-
duced me to the technicians, highlighted their practices for keeping the
environment sterile, and concluded by noting how grateful she was to
TechCore.
Scientists also maintained a shared orientation toward their work by
foregrounding shared values. The main value that scientists shared was the
centrality of patients and patient care to the laboratory’s mission. Although
some scientists disagreed with citing medicine as a justification for stem cell
research, they agreed that the connection to patients was a central value of
Med Lab. Gary and three postdoctoral fellows were practicing pediatricians;
three other fellows were pediatric instructors. Regular tasks such as cell and
tissue collection involved interactions with patients, their families, and hospital
personnel. As part of their training, newcomer technicians and Ph.D. students
shadowed the lab’s pediatricians through their hospital rounds to familiarize
themselves with patient interactions. Scientists also circulated narratives
about patient interactions. For example, Sam explained that the cells he
experimented on came from a young girl from Eastern Hospital and discussed
the difficulties of managing this donor relationship, such as the need to manage
the hopes of the patient’s family. He also recounted a dispute with a hospital
nurse that had occurred while he was working with other cells: the nurse
refused to let him take the tissue from which these cells were derived without
donor consent, even though he was within his rights as the tissue was consid-
ered medical waste. After the publication of a book about the story of HeLa
cells—widely used cancer cells named after Henrietta Lacks, a woman who
had not given consent or received compensation for giving these cells—Sherry,
a postdoctoral fellow, sent a collective e-mail publicizing the book and noting
that lab members should know the origins of these cells that were widely used
in Med Lab.
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Gary regularly enforced the connection with patients. During one lab meet-
ing, as a Ph.D. student described her project requiring cells from a patient with
a genetic disease, she waved her hand toward the surrounding hospital, noting
casually that this was ‘‘very convenient because the patient was so close.’’
Gary interrupted and, referring to the patient, said, ‘‘She is the most adorable
little girl.’’ He paused and looked across the room and then added forcefully,
‘‘And she is so, so sick!’’ After another pause, he went on to discuss matter-
of-factly the potential and flaws of the student’s research. Later, during an
interview, he acknowledged his mobilization of patient stories to personalize an
abstract argument. He considered awareness of patients as important to his
work: ‘‘We’re not pining away long hours in the lab to save some cute little
2-year-old, but when I’m in the hospital and I’m seeing those 2-year-olds, it
really has a profound effect.’’ Through these shared practices and narratives,
scientists continually emphasized collective values such as patient respect and
connection.
Discussions and debates about values that generated dissent were
circumscribed to spaces outside of the laboratory, such as the brown-bag
ethics meetings; general laboratory meetings; and outside meetings, courses,
and workshops dedicated to ethics or public policy. Although the focus of the
biweekly lab meetings was the presentation of ongoing experimental work, a
few minutes were typically dedicated to ethics and policy. Walter or Gary gave
updates on current debates or policy changes and allowed for questions on
these issues. Discussions of moral dilemmas and debates never arose at the
lab bench, although scientists welcomed a variety of talks during the generally
routine and repetitive tasks performed there. In the lab, senior scientists taught
experimental techniques and biology at length to newcomers but rarely
discussed ethical questions. When newcomers brought up dissenting topics,
senior scientists did not respond or changed the topic of discussion. In one
instance of bench work, Sherry, the postdoctoral fellow, silenced Max, the
technician working with her, by interrupting his discussion of ethical debates
and refocusing him on his current task of dissecting mouse embryos:
Max: [discussing a bioethics seminar he had recently attended]: There was a
[Eastern Hospital] person that was anti stem cells research and believed that concep-
tion began at birth. This led to a discussion on stem cell research.
Sherry: I do not agree with everything; the idea of creating non-viable embryos is a
slippery slope.
Max: We discussed the fireman’s argument: should you save 20 embryos or a
5-year-old girl? The criticism of this argument is that if you had asked Jefferson about
slaves and the 5-year-old girl, he would have chosen the girl. If life begins at concep-
tion . . .
Sherry [interrupting]: How many [mouse] embryos have you done?
Max: Ten.
Sherry: Seventeen.
In this case, Sherry initially went along with a discussion about ethics. Yet as
Max started to discuss the ethics more extensively and brought up a moral
dilemma with potential for disagreement—whether one could ethically justify
using embryos to save a living person—she reminded him to focus on their
task.
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Producing Expert Authority in Public Moral Debates
Scientists’ applied expertise about morals and cross-value collaboration pro-
vided the resources for Med Lab scientists to claim distinctive expertise in pub-
lic debates.
Claims to expertise in public debates. Med Lab scientists mobilized and
displayed their expertise in moral matters in various public and semi-public
arenas such as newspaper articles, academic articles, research seminars, dedi-
cated pages on the lab’s website, university courses, public talks, and
conferences.6 Walter authored several papers on ethics and public policy in sci-
entific and medical journals, and he added a section on ethics as a research
topic on Med Lab’s official website, alongside the biological topics. This section
included a summary of research on ethics and the list of laboratory publications.
The ethics brown-bag meetings were also advertised on the website in the
form of seminars, with a poster giving the seminar title and the speaker details.
Gary gave talks related to the ethics of stem cell research at many venues,
including a conference on the responsibility of scientists organized by a neigh-
boring university’s religious society, lectures on bioethics in other departments
of Eastern University, and a talk organized by a local cultural society.
A yearly course series of 24 talks at Eastern University on stem cell science
and ethics constituted one important avenue for Med Lab scientists’ deployment
of authoritative claims. The series was organized by Med Lab; a second stem
cells laboratory at Eastern University, hereafter Cell Lab; and the bioethics depart-
ment of another university. The course series was advertised outside the univer-
sity and gathered an audience of legislators from several states, scientists,
bioethicists, philosophers, physicians, and students of law and policy. Speakers
included scientists, policymakers, ethicists, physicians, lawyers, one lobbyist, one
gender scholar, and one member of the National Academy of Sciences.
In these talks, scientists emphasized their combined knowledge of ethics
and biology. Although they gave talks centered on biology, such as genetic
engineering, nuclear transfer, reprogramming, disease modeling, and experi-
mental protocols involving human–animal cell combinations, they consistently
presented these talks as a way to understand ethics. For example, Gary moti-
vated his talk on techniques for obtaining hESCs and iPSCs by noting that the
ethical debates related to these cells could be understood only if one under-
stood the specific techniques used for creating them. Similarly, a Cell Lab sci-
entist introduced his talk by noting, ‘‘It seems difficult to talk about the ethics
of stem cells if you don’t really understand what it [stem cell research] is.’’
One Cell Lab scientist displayed command of bioethics to a bioethicist by
blending knowledge of biology and ethics in his discussion of a cure involving
genetic engineering of stem cells:
Scientist: There is the issue of germ-line risk. Are we willing to take this sort of risk
to cure such conditions as leukemia?
Bioethicist: What is the argument against going to the germ line?
Scientist: Concerns about violating the natural order.
6 To protect the lab’s anonymity, the claims made in the press by Med Lab scientists are not
presented in the paper.
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Walter showcased his expertise in ethics as he designed and conducted a
workshop on the approval of experimental protocols. He gave the workshop
participants teaching cases involving several experimental protocols calling for
the blending of human and animal cells. One protocol involved injecting hESCs
into the leg of a mouse, another involved injecting iPSCs into a monkey’s brain,
and a third involved injecting iPSCs into an animal egg. Participants acted as a
university’s institutional stem cell research oversight committee and decided
whether to authorize these protocols. He invited participants to consider their
own moral boundaries, the types of biological organisms created, and the
extent to which science required animal models for its in-vivo experiments with
human stem cells—and thus the creation of what could be considered human–
animal hybrids.
Boundary closure in public debates. Jurisdictional boundary closure
relates to professionals’ capacity to demarcate themselves as a recognizable
group of experts (Abbott, 1988). As Med Lab scientists had maintained their
collective membership and collaboration with the lab, they were able to present
themselves as a community of experts regardless of their values. In public
forums, they repeatedly emphasized their communalism and their distinc-
tiveness from non-experts about moral matters. Scientists emphasized how
hESC and iPSC research mutually contributed to each other. For instance, Gary
introduced a talk by Shinya Yamanaka, a scientist outspoken for eschewing
research with human embryos for moral reasons who was awarded the Nobel
Prize for his work on reprogramming. In his introduction, Gary praised
Yamanaka’s contribution to both science and ethics. In return, Yamanaka
praised Gary for ‘‘keeping me and the field competitive.’’
Scientists highlighted that the coexistence of the plural research programs
allowed science to address the moral issues. In one talk Gary emphasized that
reprogramming constituted a breakthrough in the moral debate: ‘‘There is no
doubt that the work has changed the nature of the ethics.’’ One bioethicist
noted that ‘‘Despite an inability to get political consensus, the science has
presented opportunities for a variety of moral views to have an outlet.’’
Scientists also emphasized their membership in a community of expertise
that included expertise in ethics. For example, when a scientist discussed the
use of human embryos discarded from the IVF process after a preimplantation
genetic diagnostic, he emphasized consensus within the community versus lay
understandings ‘‘outside the community’’:
I would say that they should be used primarily by research because it is the intent of
the couple to discard them because they are not viable. I would say that they are the
least ethically controversial of the embryos. I take issue with using the notion of ‘‘eth-
ically controversial’’ for this pool. . . . In the research community, there is an agree-
ment about the fact that it is not controversial. But this is a small community.
Outside the community, there is still debate; it is still blurry in the public discourse.
We need to keep this in mind when asking consent.
Gary similarly located expertise about ethics within the stem cell community.
For example, he discussed the compensation for egg donation by emphasizing
collective discussion among scientists within the International Society for Stem
Cell Research (ISSCR): ‘‘After reviewing the compensation of $8,000 for egg
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donation at [university], we at the ISSCR felt that this represented undue
inducement.’’ Later in the talk, he located disagreements over the nature of
embryos as an expert debate within the stem cell community: ‘‘Embryologists
do not agree about what is an embryo, a totipotent cell, a pluripotent cell.’’
Concurrently, scientists highlighted the moral dangers of decisions and
actions taken beyond their community. In one talk, Gary expressed concern
that policy threatened scientific relevance: ‘‘Moving toward iPSC may be politi-
cally expedient, but it is not a scientific judgment. I gave you a lot of biology,
but I want to argue that there is a lot of scientific rationale for continuing [the
derivation of hESCs]. I hope that this will not come back to haunt us, but I think
we ignore these issues at our own risks.’’
Scientists also warned about the dangers of putting faith in fake physicians
profiting from stem cell hype and patient despair. Stories of fraudulent
practices ranged from warnings that fake cures would have no effect and could
prevent a sick person from undergoing proven treatment, to more gruesome
accounts of patients dying following the injection of stem cells in loosely super-
vised settings. In a talk on stem cell cures, a physician told the story of a child
who died after flying to Russia with his parents to undergo an injection of stem
cells into his brain. In a talk on the responsibility of the scientist, Gary used the
same story to demarcate the ‘‘responsible scientist’’ from the ‘‘vendors of
snake oil’’ who promised fake stem cell cures. In these narratives, illegitimacy
was attributed not to a specific moral perspective but to the lack of professional
standards.
Thus authority over moral questions was claimed based on a combination of
demonstrable expertise located within the stem cell community. Equipped with
detailed and demonstrable expertise about the plurality of moral perspectives
on their work, Med Lab scientists located morals within their boundaries of
expert authority. Rather than enacting divisions along values, they established
distinctions between experts and non-experts about moral matters, and they
grounded moral authority not in a particular set of values but in their shared
expertise about moral values. Gary illustrated this confidence in scientists’
authority based on their combined moral and scientific expertise:
I feel science should be a leading voice in defining issues of truth and knowledge
and, to some extent, the distinctions between sorts of morality. . . . As a scientist, I
fundamentally think that we’re trying to discover closer and closer approximations of
the truth. And to a great extent, the other ways of looking at answering questions,
faith-based ways of looking at answering questions, all escape a lot of the realities of
physics, chemistry, and biology. When I look at the contentious ethical issues that
we’ve dealt with, which fundamentally are on the rights and definition of the human
blastocyst, we raise questions about the nature of personhood—what we should, as
a community, be protecting in the notion of personhood.
Epilogue: The Moral Authority of Stem Cell Scientists
While this analysis detailed how moral authority is forged at the micro level in
one prominent laboratory, field-level evidence shows that other prominent
stem cell scientists in the field made similar claims to expert moral authority.
Field-level evidence also suggests that the scientists’ claim to moral authority
were successful as resistance to their work appeared to decrease after 2007.
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Claims to moral authority at the field level. Scientists beyond Med Lab
also claimed applied knowledge about plural moral values and affirmed their
cohesion as stem cell scientists beyond their specific values. A content analy-
sis of statements from stem cell scientists in The New York Times between
2004 and 2010 yielded 12 articles with direct statements from scientists, total-
ing 78 statements by 15 different scientists. A search of The New England
Journal of Medicine, The Christian Science Monitor, and The Wall Street
Journal for the same period produced 30 more statements from stem cell
scientists. In these statements, scientists voiced various moral values, either
defending human embryonic research as moral or as morally complicated. In
15 statements, scientists discussed their inclusion of ethics in science.
Scientists mentioned or evidenced communality or unity among themselves in
17 statements, generally stressing the contribution of hESC research to iPSC
research. Table 3 presents an illustrative sample of these statements.
In addition, scientists developed shared resources, including professional
associations (e.g., ISSCR), dedicated journals (e.g., Stem Cell Reports, Cell
Stem Cell), conferences, foundations, cell banks and repositories, and several
large university-based research centers and institutes. Overall, whether work-
ing with embryonic stem cells or induced pluripotent cells, scientists have
retained the common label ‘‘stem cells’’ and have continued working in joint
centers and laboratories.
Decreasing resistance from stakeholders and expansion of stem cell
research. For claims to authority to be deemed successful, they must be
accepted by the main audiences of these claims—in this case, members of the
public, the media, and policymakers. The ultimate expansion of an activity after
a period of restricted growth can be taken as a proxy for the general accep-
tance of a previously contested practice (Zelizer, 1983). Stem cell research
appears to have been largely successful after 2007. Policy restrictions had a
moderating influence on stem cell research in its early years by restricting the
number of stem cell lines available (Scott, McCormick, and Owen-Smith, 2009)
and the number of research centers and laboratories where stem cell research
could take place (McCormick, Owen-Smith, and Scott, 2009). But research with
iPSCs expanded markedly and the level of hESC research was maintained after
2007, with overall output of stem cell research rising markedly. Illustrating this
growth, Figure 2 summarizes the number of publications citing hESCs and
iPSCs from U.S. laboratories between 1998 and 2013.
Decreasing resistance from the public and the media after 2007 is also more
directly evidenced by the media’s decreasing interest in the stem cell debate.
The yearly number of articles published in The New York Times citing stem cell
research reached an apex between 2001 and 2007 but declined rapidly after
2007; see Figure 3. Finally, resistance from policymakers also eased over time.
Legal restrictions were gradually lifted after 2009 without any return of restric-
tive policies as had been the case in the previous two decades. In 2009,
President Obama overturned the federal funding ban and formed a panel to
implement funding guidelines aligned with National Academy of Sciences
guidelines, already defined by a scientific panel. A growing number of hESC
lines were approved for federal funding in the subsequent years. One of the
last reported challenges to stem cell research was raised in 2010 when a judge
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sought to reinstate the ban on federal funding for hESC lines. The ruling was
overturned a year later on appeal. No significant legal challenge was raised
since this ruling. Overall, these field-level data highlight that the main
stakeholders not only decreased their resistance to stem cell research but also
accepted some of the scientists’ claims by adopting and maintaining some of
their ethical guidelines as federal policy.
Table 3. Rhetorical Arguments about the Morality of Stem Cell Research from Scientists in the
Press
Illustrative Statements
Plural moral values Human embryonic stem cell research is moral:
‘‘There’s nothing unethical about what we’re doing here. We think embryonic stem cells can
be made to become pancreatic beta cells and that they will be able to help diabetics
produce their own insulin. I’ve never once doubted the morality of this work.’’ (Stem cell
scientist quoted in NYT, Jan. 24, 2006)
‘‘The central issue is whether it is morally justifiable to use preimplantation-stage human
embryos in the search to understand human biology and cure serious diseases. We believe
it to be justified, and the diversion of resources to alternative approaches that offer no
scientific benefit merely diminishes the likelihood of success.’’ (Op-ed by stem cell
scientists, New England Journal of Medicine, Dec. 30, 2004)
Human embryonic stem cell research is morally complex:
‘‘Dr. Thomson’s laboratory at the University of Wisconsin was one of two that in 1998
plucked stem cells from human embryos for the first time, destroying the embryos in the
process and touching off a divisive national debate. . . . ‘If human embryonic stem cell
research does not make you at least a little bit uncomfortable, you have not thought about it
enough,’ he said. ‘I thought long and hard about whether I would do it.’’’ (NYT, Nov. 22,
2007)
‘‘‘When I saw the embryo, I suddenly realized there was such a small difference between it
and my daughters,’ said Dr. Yamanaka, 45, a father of two and now a professor at the
Institute for Integrated Cell-Material Sciences at Kyoto University. ‘I thought, we can’t keep
destroying embryos for our research. There must be another way.’’’ (NYT, Dec. 11, 2007)
Claims to applied
expertise about morals
‘‘In 1995, [Dr. Thomson] began consulting with two ethicists at his university, Dr. Norman
Fost, a physician, and Ms. Charo, a law professor. He wanted to anticipate what the ethical
problems might be and what the criticisms might be. Dr. Fost was impressed. ‘It is unusual
in the history of science for a scientist to really want to think carefully about the ethical
implications of his work before he sets out to do it,’ Dr. Fost said. ‘The biggest problem in
ethics is not anticipating problems.’’’ (NYT, Nov. 22, 2007)
‘‘With the new [reprogramming] method, human cloning for stem cell research, like the
creation of human embryos to extract stem cells, may be unnecessary. . . . ‘It really is
amazing,’ said Dr. Leonard Zon, director of the stem cell program at Children’s Hospital
Boston at Harvard Medical School. And, said Dr. Douglas A. Melton, co-director of the Stem
Cell Institute at Harvard University, it is ‘ethically uncomplicated.’’’ (NYT, Nov. 21, 2007)
Claims to cross-value
unity
‘‘Dr. Yamanaka said that he was discomforted by the use of embryonic stem cells but that
his own research would have been impossible without it.’’ (NYT, Dec. 17, 2009)
‘‘I’m very pleased they have taken feedback of an overwhelming majority of the scientific
community and responded with a science-friendly proposal.’’ (Stem cell scientist quoted in
NYT, June 6, 2009)
‘‘‘The gold standard is still hESC,’ says Carol Ware, who directs the Tom and Sue Ellison
Stem Cell Core at the University of Washington. If hESC research disappears, ‘you’ve lost
your control group,’ the base line against which to compare the iPSC cell work.’’ (Christian
Science Monitor, Oct. 12, 2010)
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DISCUSSION
The analysis presented in this paper unpacked one mechanism by which
professionals expanded their expert authority over the moral definition of their
work, thereby developing a form of moral authority. In doing so, they expanded
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their jurisdictional boundaries to encompass a larger field of professional activ-
ity (a larger research area) and initially peripheral activities (participation in moral
debates).
As professionals pursue more widespread expertise and address more com-
plex questions related to financial, health, and environmental issues and risks,
the morality of their activities has come under increased scrutiny. In response,
scholars of professions have explored the multiple tensions between morals
and professional authority. Prior work has shown that while the control of
abstract knowledge is central to the establishment of authority over a work
domain (Abbott, 1988; Freidson, 1988; Larson, 2013), involvement in moral
issues is considered detrimental to professional control (Abbott, 1988; Moore,
1996). This study highlights that the development and control of expert knowl-
edge about morals is not necessarily incompatible with professional authority.
Indeed, knowledge about morals may be mobilized in the pursuit of expert con-
trol in the same way that abstract technical knowledge may be. Both bodies of
knowledge may together expand professional boundaries of authority by creat-
ing an assemblage of multifaceted expertise and concrete achievements in
practice.
In the case examined here, professional authority was reinforced by the
development of detailed knowledge of plural interpretations of the morality of
science—as secular and as open to religious beliefs, as the basis for medicine
and as pure science, and as a distinctly rational institution and as an institution
open to all constituencies regardless of their beliefs. This knowledge was even-
tually embedded in the profession’s core when it was applied to research
programs. Although the purposes of developing hES and iPS cells—both of
which could be used for research and medicine—can be considered equivalent,
the incorporation of diverse values in research programs led to different
regimes of scientific production, resulting in diverse scientific processes and
innovations. Moral and technical knowledge, assembled in practice, formed
new knowledge bases on which scientists could both expand their work and
ground their authority in public moral debates. Developing knowledge about
plural moral values enabled scientists to maintain their inclusion of central
members of their profession and develop multiple research programs aligned
with their values. These professionals thus expanded their jurisdiction to exer-
cise control over a larger and more productive area of scientific work.
The Moral Foundations of Professional Authority
By unpacking how expertise about morals provides resources for professional
authority, this study contributes to growing research on the moral foundations
of professional authority, even where morality has been eluded until now (e.g.,
Freidson, 2001; Khurana, 2010; Briscoe and Murphy, 2012; Anteby, 2013).
Scholars have largely focused on crafting moral legitimacy—perceived confor-
mity to social expectations of what is right—as the criterion for success in mor-
ally contested work. This study complicates our understanding by showing that
professional actors engaging in morally complex activities may pursue not just
moral legitimacy but also moral authority—control over the definition of social
expectations of what is right. In addition, this work suggests that the turn
toward expertise in professional work identified by several scholars (e.g.,
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Abbott, 1988; Brint, 1996) entails not necessarily a retreat to a technical core
but also the codification of morals into new bases of expert authority.
Prior literature has shown that the pursuit of moral legitimacy has allowed
some professionals to secure a stable and sometimes productive space for
their activities (Zelizer, 1983; Chan, 2009; Anteby, 2010). But the pursuit of
legitimacy is dependent on the adoption of external sources of moral authority,
which leaves professional members subject to control by audiences whose
acceptance they rely on (e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Turco, 2012). In con-
trast, the pursuit of moral authority allows professionals to strengthen their
control over their work areas.
Indeed, the pursuit of expertise-based moral authority is inseparable from
struggles over the control of work. Professionals maintain control through vari-
ous means including directly ignoring managerial commands (Kellogg, 2009),
relying on abstract knowledge controlled by the profession (Freidson, 1988),
rhetorically delegitimizing competing groups (Gieryn, 1999), and making work
indecipherable to non-experts (Evans and Silbey, 2017). In this case,
professionals developed control over knowledge about the morality of their
work. In doing so they extended their control over the moral definition of their
work and strengthened their jurisdiction more generally.
The claim to moral authority unpacked in this study is not grounded in a par-
ticular moral perspective but in the mastery and articulation of the different
moral perspectives about a work area. Thus, while the pursuit of moral author-
ity may no longer be grounded in the cultivation of specific virtues, it may per-
sist in the expert articulation of moral valuations of complex activities. Several
professions demonstrate this rise of expertise-based articulation of moral
questions. Ethicists are increasingly solicited as consultants by biotechnological
firms, pharmaceutical firms, pension funds, and sovereign wealth funds seek-
ing expert advice on the ethical and social implications of their activities and
seeking guidelines for business or investment decisions (Eaton, 2004; Council
on Ethics for the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, 2018). Socially
responsible investment analysts have emerged as professionals focused on
finding and defining responsible investment possibilities for the finance industry
(Arjalies, Kodeih, and Raynard, 2015). Some service designers distinguish
themselves from traditional designers based on espoused values in lieu of tech-
nical expertise (Fayard, Stigliani, and Bechky, 2017).
As the stem cell debate occurred at the nexus of several institutions—
science, religion, civil society, academia, and government—multiple experts
and bodies of knowledge were involved. By developing their knowledge of plu-
ral moral views on stem cell science, scientists were able to articulate and con-
trol detailed knowledge of both sides of the debate about the use of human
embryos for science and medicine. In addition, by combining knowledge of
morals with their biological knowledge, scientists developed a unique assem-
blage of expertise. This complex and multifaceted knowledge allowed
scientists to claim superior knowledge in the multiparty deliberations.
Scientists are adept at establishing themselves as experts on matters related
to science. In this case, they established themselves as experts on two bodies
of knowledge involved in the public debates—scientific and moral knowledge—
and thereby established themselves as central experts in the moral definition
of their work.
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Of course, few professionals can achieve control over the moral definition of
their work. The development and application of additional knowledge is costly,
and most occupational and professional groups are faced with efficiency and
profitability pressures. This study thus suggests one important condition for the
development of moral authority: a high degree of autonomy. Occupational
groups with different levels of autonomy from organizational demands respond
differently to efficiency or profitability pressures (Freidson, 2001; Gray and
Silbey, 2014; Bechky and Chung, 2018). Professionals partially sheltered from
efficiency and profitability pressures can develop and deploy additional
resources such as expertise for their continued defense of such shelters
(Freidson, 2001). Some organizations allow for some level of professional
autonomy in the completion of complex tasks (e.g., Bechky and Chung, 2018).
It may also be in some organizations’ interest to allow sufficient autonomy for
their members to develop complex and unscripted responses to societal
expectations. While Med Lab is subject to efficiency, financial, and reputational
pressures from its hosting university and hospital, Med Lab scientists nonethe-
less have high levels of autonomy. They were able to dedicate resources to ini-
tially peripheral activities such as the elaboration of ethics research, seminars,
and courses, and they autonomously chose to apply this knowledge of ethics
to a plurality of research programs and technologies. In sum, they had the dis-
cretion to enact plural moral values in their work—although maintaining these
plural values was likely conditional upon the success of the resulting research
programs. While the promotion of moral claims by organizations is rife with
tensions, this research shows that some professional groups within
organizations can nonetheless maintain the latitude to pursue a variety of moral
claims.
Not all members of a profession are likely to have the autonomy and
resources to deploy and defend complex moral claims about their work.
Elaborating and mobilizing expert knowledge in public and policy debates will
likely remain the province of a few elite members who can establish them-
selves as spokespersons for their profession and thus reinforce their centrality
within that profession. Professionals’ capacity to engage in public debates
about the means and ends of their work thus may depend on the ability and
willingness of the more central members to devote the resources to become
independent moral voices in public debates. Further research could examine
how the characteristics of various occupational and professional groups, includ-
ing resources, levels of autonomy, and within-organization and within-
occupation relations, may condition professionals’ ability to address the moral-
ity of their work.
One limitation of this study may be that scientists are more adept than most
professionals at mobilizing and debating diverse, competing, and sometimes
apparently incommensurable forms of knowledge (Kuhn, 2012). Future
research should explore how professionals with more routinized and less
exploratory tasks and goals may develop the capacity for integrating and mobi-
lizing moral pluralism. Certainly, general managers have often eschewed the
open discussion of plural moral valuations of their work (e.g., Anteby, 2013).
Yet the emerging debate among finance professionals over the inclusion of
environmental and social criteria in financial tools—and the recruitment of
specialists focused on the definition of socially responsible investment vehicles
(Arjalies, Kodeih, and Raynard, 2015)—may constitute a parallel context to
Evans 39
study how professionals other than scientists might develop expertise related
to plural moral values within their ranks and whether these actions might solid-
ify or threaten their jurisdictional authority.
Another limitation pertains to the high status of the scientific profession.
Science already enjoys considerable authority in contemporary societies, and
the scientists who became involved in the stem cell debates belonged to some
of the more central and highly endowed research centers and laboratories. It
remains to be seen whether less elite professionals might be able to achieve
such levels of authority in moral debates. Further research could examine
whether and how occupational groups with fewer cultural resources may be
able to influence the moral assumptions about their work.
The Generativity of Moral Pluralism
This paper also contributes to research on morals and organized activities (e.g.,
Healy, 2004; Almeling, 2007; Anteby, 2010; Turco, 2012; Howard-Grenville
et al., 2017) by highlighting the generative role of moral pluralism for complex
work activities. Past scholarship has shown that when faced with morally com-
plex activities, occupational actors have either adopted univocal moral
justifications and frameworks (e.g., Zelizer, 1983) or remained silent and dele-
gated moral deliberation to external parties (Moore, 1996; Anteby, 2013). Yet
univocal justification and silence entail specific problems. Because univocal
frames hinge on the mobilization of external sources of morality such as reli-
gion or tradition (Zelizer, 1983; Chan, 2009) or simply fail to capture the com-
plexity and fluidity of moral dilemmas (Anteby, 2013), they are often in tension
with competing organizational values including efficiency (Healy, 2004) and
profitability (Turco, 2012). While silence can enable discretionary personal
examination and decision making (Anteby, 2013), it may also enable existing
structures of power—whether legal, professional, or organizational—to remain
taken for granted (Jackall, 1988; Ewick and Silbey, 2003).
In open and plural societies, workplaces are characterized by the coexis-
tence of multiple and often conflicting institutionalized assumptions, such as
those of states, religion, or science and education (Friedland and Alford, 1991),
whose tensions and contradictions suffuse local interpretations, interactions,
and actions (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006). Occupations that engage in morally
complex work are thus most likely ‘‘inhabited’’ (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006) by
members holding multiple perspectives and values. When moral pluralism is
not silenced but articulated and given force and meaning through local
interactions, it may allow for more flexible alignment with both internal and
external constituencies. In the case of stem cell science, the articulation of plu-
ral moral accounts allowed professionals to forge flexible justifications that
connected with external constituencies concerned with the practices of stem
cell science such as policymakers, religious groups, patient groups, donors,
and the public. Internally, maintaining pluralism allowed for the recruitment and
maintenance of productive members holding a variety of moral perspectives.
Consequently, pluralism can enable higher productivity and dynamism. Prior
works have shown that pluralism can induce change (Howard-Grenville et al.,
2017) and, when sustained, lead to coexisting regimes of production (Almeling,
2007). The emergence of green chemistry was led by chemists who sought to
develop more sustainable alternatives to traditional chemistry practices and
40 Administrative Science Quarterly (2021)
production (Howard-Grenville et al., 2017). Similarly, differing moral valuations
of male and female reproductive materials have led to parallel production and
commercialization of these materials, with different modes of donor recruit-
ment, construction of donor profiles for clients, matchmaking processes, and
fees (Almeling, 2007).
Pluralism in stem cell science enabled the expansion of two highly produc-
tive research programs: one grounded in the pursuit of stem cell science and
medicine using embryos and their derived cells and another grounded in the
pursuit of similar aims but bypassing the use of human embryos and their cells.
Although iPSCs emerged through the search for a technical equivalent to
hESCs, their creation led to distinct research programs, funding, publications,
and researchers. Pluralism allowed not only the emergence of reprogramming
but also the maintenance of research with hESCs (refer to Figure 2).
Productivity was sustained not only by the legitimation of hESC research and
related policy changes but also by the capacity for stem cell science to attract
diverse scientists and allow for knowledge sharing among them. These efforts
also facilitated the productivity of the larger field since the research models
resulting from Med Lab’s scientists’ efforts—the newly created iPSCs and the
newly authorized hESCs—were distributed to all requesting laboratories.
Sustaining pluralism, especially within a shared workplace, remains a chal-
lenge. Pluralism creates tensions across groups with differing moral views
about what constitutes good work (Howard-Grenville et al., 2017) and can con-
flict with professionals’ efforts to present their knowledge as objective and
unbiased by moral considerations. Yet this study shows that members of a
same group can collaborate even when holding different views on a potentially
very divisive issue. This suggests some ways for sustaining pluralism in the
workplace.
First, the capacity for open debate within the laboratory sustained pluralism
over time, and that capacity was carefully orchestrated. The translation of per-
sonal values in professional language allowed for discussion on rational rather
than moralizing or personal grounds. Rather than potentially calling each other
out on their personal morals, scientists collectively engaged in professional
debates and knowledge building. The use of dedicated space, time, and lan-
guage for ethical debate framed the modalities of dissent and allowed for pro-
ductive collaboration and knowledge exchange unhindered by potential dissent
over the means and ends of a collective endeavor. In addition, the capacity to
display their unity as professional experts in the moral debates undoubtedly
motivated the scientists to continue building consensus and collaboration
across values.
Second, maintaining pluralism is likely linked to the elaboration of productive
coexisting regimes of production, particularly in scientific and technical
professions. In the case of stem cell science, successful innovations allowed
scientists with diverse values to craft a productive space within their profes-
sion. Material objects, such as scientific tools and research models, inscribe
the assumptions of their creators, including moral assumptions (Rheinberger,
1997), and they order the constitution of communities into coherent systems
of knowledge, practices, and moral understandings (Kohler, 1994; Rheinberger,
1997; Knorr-Cetina, 1999). The contribution of hESC research to medicine and
to the emergence of iPSCs sustained the moral claims of hESC researchers.
Similarly, the scientific success of iPSCs made it possible for scientists
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opposed to the use of human embryos to claim that they could also contribute
to stem cell science albeit with different values. As scientists productively
worked, debated, collaborated, and exchanged knowledge in the same
workspace, their distinct research models allowed them to develop coexisting
productive research areas that supported their avowed values.
These elements thus suggest that the maintenance of pluralism is intimately
linked to the pursuit of expanded professional authority: the pursuit of authorita-
tive control over an expanded work domain. Given the generativity of open
debate and pluralism at work, further studies could explore whether and how
pluralism may be sustained absent the pursuit of professional expansion. We
know that change efforts can motivate the expression of pluralism (e.g.,
Meyerson and Scully, 1995; Howard-Grenville et al., 2017), but many change
processes are temporary. Professional jurisdictions in our societies are con-
stantly pursued and renegotiated and thus may be more constant drivers for
the inclusion of pluralism at work. Further research could unpack more
conditions for the sustained inclusion of pluralism.
This study has presented detailed observations of ground-level interactions
whereby professionals strengthened their authority by voicing and mobilizing
diverse moral preferences. In doing so, it has highlighted how professionals’
capacity to become or remain authoritative moral voices in social debates is
negotiated on the ground through everyday interactions and actions. It has also
provided further evidence of the micro-ground interactions and actions that sus-
tain the authority of central institutions, such as science, through extensions of
professional jurisdictions.
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